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Abstract
The thesis is structured in three articles which develop an anal-
ysis focused on the effects of labour market regulation on the
labour market outcome and country economic performance.
The first paper makes a review of literature by supporting the
"OECD-IMF orthodoxy" according to which the rigidities im-
posed by labour market institutions are crucial determinants
to explain European unemployment. Many works have been
published which support this view. While these studies have
become increasingly complex, the empirical results do not ap-
pear to be robust since they are highly sensitive to the nature
of variables, the time period, and the econometric methods ap-
plied. Various reasons explain the adherence to this orthodoxy:
the existence of priors, poor data on labour market institu-
tions, as well as unsuitable econometric techniques. Consider-
ing that additional cross-country analysis will not be decisive to
improve our understanding of labour market institutions, this
paper suggests new investigations which rely on time-series-
cross-section (TSCS) techniques, micro-analysis of firms and
workers, as well as human subject and artificial experiments.
The second paper delves into the relationship existing between
labour market flexibility - epitomized by the proportion of tem-
porary and part-time workers - and companies’ ability to in-
novate - as measured by the percentage of new products in
total sales. Even though it is an important issue affecting a
country economic growth, the analysis of the flexibility effects
on companies’ innovativeness is almost neglected in current
literature. On the one hand, ’more flexibility’ (i.e. a higher
labour turnover) might foster firms’ innovation potential. Be-
side having (potential) wage savings effects, a larger inflow of
xi
new staff may enrich the pool of companies’ innovative ideas.
On the other hand, greater work flexibility may have some
drawbacks: steadily high rates of people entering and leaving
firms may reduce social cohesion and trust, as well as increase
the probability of opportunistic behaviour. Results suggest
that a higher percentage of internal flexibility is associated with
greater propensity to innovate, especially in high-tech firms. In
line with the 1999/70/EC European directive, these results also
suggest that fixed-term contracts (external flexibility) might be
useful in periods of extraordinary corporate activity, but can
have disadvantages for firms innovativeness and productivity if
improperly used during normal activity.
Finally, the third paper refers to one of the most attractive
model for policymakers in Europe: the flexicurity model that
combines elements of flexibility in labour markets with income
and employment security for workers. Although common prin-
ciples might drive labour market reforms, flexicurity should
take up different forms from country to country. The aim of
this work is investigate which is the suitable pathway for Italy
and identify the advantages and risks of adopting flexicurity
policies. In the first part, the paper examines flexicurity in
Denmark, one of the leading country in this field, and then
focuses on Italian labour market only. In particular, on the
basis of an experimental analysis, the second part investigates
the possibility for Italy to follow the first European flexicurity
pathway which - in the case of countries with segmented labour
markets - suggests to rely on contractual arrangements to dis-
tribute flexibility and security more evenly across the work-
force. Unlike other experimental analysis, in this case the level
of unemployment is determined endogenously and the level of
efforts made is observable with a certain degree of uncertainty.
This feature allows to study the interactions of labour market
regulation and firms’ employment policy in determining the un-
employment level. Results suggest that - especially in countries
xii
such as Italy, where there is limited scope for increasing spend-
ing - these contractual arrangements can improve the situation
both for workers and companies.
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Chapter 1
Beyond the
OECD-IMF
orthodoxy
Abstract
The central message of the OECD Job Study (1994) and the
IMF report (1997) is that the rigidities imposed by labour mar-
ket institutions and policies are crucial determinants in the
explanation of the European unemployment. In recent years,
many works have been published supporting this view, also
known as the "OECD-IMF orthodoxy". This article evaluates
the literature for this labour market rigidity to see whether the
available evidence provides empirical support for the labour
market rigidity explanation. While these studies have become
increasingly complex, the actual empirical results appear not
robust since they are highly sensitive to the nature of vari-
ables, the time period, and the econometric methods applied.
Different reasons explain the adherence to this orthodoxy: the
existence of priors, poor data on labour market institutions, as
well as unsuitable econometric techniques.
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To improve our understanding of labour market institutions,
additional studies making cross-country comparisons will not
be decisive. This paper proposes instead new investigations
which rely on highly sophisticated TSCS techniques, micro-
analysis of firms and workers, as well as human subject and
artificial experiments.
“The true is that it exists an optimum in the degree of flexibility,
which does not coincide with its maximum at all” [P. Sylos Labini]
1.1 Introduction
Nowadays, deregulating markets seems the only feasible way
to obtain fulfilling economic performance. But are light insti-
tutions, along with wage and flexible labour arrangements the
right track to succeed? In spite of decades of empirical and
theoretical analysis, a widely shared view does not exit.
On the one hand, there are economists, international agencies
and policy-makers who support the view that institutions are
the cause of economic distress and poor performance. The
OECD study of 1994 is a case in point (Jobs Study). In this
work, in order to improve country economic performance, four
factors linked to the labour market deregulation were indi-
cated among others1: increasing the flexibility of labour work-
ing time schedules; making labour wages and costs more flexi-
ble; changing unemployment benefits; reforming labour protec-
tions. Conversely, a fifth factor considers a direct and active
intervention in the market, by means of training activities, as-
sistance in looking for a job and incentives to hire long-term
unemployed people. The same view is shared by the IMF (1997,
1In order to improve the countries’ economic performance, ten factors were identified:
good macroeconomic policies; dissemination of technical knowledge; removing obstacles
for the emergence of new enterprises; improving education and training; increasing
competition in the product markets. See OECD (1994a).
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2003a) which few years later maintained that institutions could
be obstacles to economic efficiency.2
The ILO has an opposite view. According to this organisation,
and in line with the analysis proposed by Coase (1960), the ex-
istence of labour market institutions, and bargaining between
actors should be able to produce the optimal allocation of re-
sources and - as long as transaction costs are not excessive - a
redistribution of income to workers’ benefit, without affecting
economic efficiency (Freeman (2005)). Similarly, in 2003 also
the World Bank published a book reporting that high unioniza-
tion rates at macroeconomic level lead to lower wage inequal-
ities and can improve economic performance. Various authors
also showed that policy can address labour market imperfec-
tions, such as difficulties in matching demand and supply, and
can also foster efficient labour reallocation and consumption
smoothing in the presence of financial and other market im-
perfections (Bertola (2004); MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007);
Wasmer (2006)).
Despite a growing number of economists and agencies who
question the ‘OECD-IMF’ view, however, most studies on labour
market institutions conclude - to various extents - that evi-
dence supports this orthodoxy, which means that institutions
did matter in determining the unemployment pattern in the
period from the 1960s to the 1990s.
Hence what explains the strict adherence to the ‘OECD-IMF’
orthodoxy and such an inconclusive debate? As argued by
Freeman (2005), there are two main reasons. The first reason is
that many advocates hold strong priors that the labour market
operates almost perfectly without institutions. Consequently,
we are in a situation in which researchers’ expectations are
2The disagreement which is recorded when studying the effects of institutions on the
unemployment rate does not exist when explaining the effects on income distribution. It
is widely recognized that the presence of these institutions - trade unions, in particular
- reduce income inequality.
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affected by their ex-ante knowledge, and both the choice of
models and interpretation of results might be driven by these
beliefs. For example, in some cases, this has lead researchers
to interpret simple correlation as causal relationships.
The second reason is that cross-country aggregate data used
in these analyses is too weak to decisively accept or reject the
orthodox view. In this regard, emphasis must be laid on the
comprehensive survey provided by the recent work of Baker
et al. (2005). These authors observed that almost all the works
examining the relationship between unemployment and labour
market institutions are too sensitive to model specifications
and variable definitions, thus providing different and diverging
results. Even if we only focused on the aspects of these studies
which appear more sound, the range of coefficient estimations
would be striking. For example, for a 10% tax increase, stud-
ies report a 0.9% increase in the unemployment rate, whereas
other studies report a 2.1% increase (Elmeskov et al. (1998),
Nickell (1997)); extending the length of unemployment ben-
efit by one year makes the unemployment rate rise to about
0.7-1.4% (Nickell (1997), Bertola (2005)). However, if we con-
sidered the results related to other more sensitive variables -
such as firing costs - estimates would appear even more var-
ied. Although we can explain these differences as a result of
the way in which variables were constructed, the indications
arising from these studies remain uncertain and the potential
benefits which could be provided by these policies turn out to
be rather blurred. In addition, even though the Job Study of
1994 recognized that active labour policies are factors which
reduce unemployment, there is the tendency to neglect the ex-
planatory power of the variables representing these "good insti-
tutions". In fact, in most studies, the coefficient regarding the
variables representing active policies resulted significant and
negative.
Hence, shall we conclude that the attempt to understand the
4
effects of labour market institutions is a mission impossible?
What can we do in order to find a rational explanation of these
effects? Which indications can we infer from the theoretical
analysis?
As suggested by Freeman (2005), additional studies using ag-
gregate data and making cross-country comparisons will not
settle this debate as they will all share these weaknesses. A
step forward is represented by the empirical micro-analysis of
companies, workers and unions, along with agent simulations
and market experiments. Studies on firms whose organization
is rather complex or experimental economics may offer insights
on the way in which institutions work at a higher level and on
the conditions under which institutions may have positive or
negative effects on economic performance.
The aim of this work is provide a review of the studies on
labour market institutions and their impact on unemployment
and economic performance. As literature is wide, an attempt
is made to group the most influential works in relation to their
main model specifications, by also trying to provide a flavour
of their evolution over time. Specific attention will also be paid
to the dataset and econometric techniques used in these works.
One of the main concerns related to the dataset on institutions
and labour arrangements is that the series are fairly poor com-
pared to other economic variables. In order to study labour
market institutions, it is worth relying on tricks available for
time-series-cross-section techniques, which are similar to panel
dataset where the dimension is rather high. With a view to
providing a complete picture, this paper also briefly review the
major works on unemployment entry and exit flows. Finally,
and in keeping with the argument proposed by Freeman, it
presents the results from recent works on experimental labour
economics and labour market microanalysis which investigate
different, crucial labour market institutions.
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This paper is structured as follows: the next section briefly
reviews the main issues related to theoretical and empirical
cross-country studies, which investigate the role of labour insti-
tutions in their interactions with macroeconomic shocks, prod-
uct/financial markets and other labour institutions. It also
examines the consequences of looking to the labour market dy-
namics. Section 3 analyses the main concerns related to the
dataset generally used in cross-country analysis of labour mar-
ket institutions, as well as the advantages related to time-series-
cross-section (TSCS) techniques. Finally, section 4 stresses the
possibility of creating new data by means of experiments and
simulations with artificial agents. Conclusions are drawn in the
final section.
1.2 Theory and evidence
Even though there exist many theoretical positions to explain
long-term unemployment, basically there are two streams of
analysis: models based on flows (i.e, Pissarides (2000)) and
models based on stocks (Bertola and Koeniger (2007); Nick-
ell et al. (2005)). While neglecting other aspects, the follow-
ing conclusions can be broadly drawn. Firstly, both in the
short and long term, the level of unemployment must be con-
sistent with the level of real demand. Secondly, in the long
run, demand and unemployment reach their equilibrium level,
in which inflation is stable. Finally, the unemployment equi-
librium level is affected by every factor capable of affecting
the way in which people, who are looking for a job, can fill
vacancies (matching) or - in other words - reduce labour mar-
ket frictions. These factors take up the form of labour market
institutions (Nickell et al. (2005)).
The need to consider all these factors when turning these pre-
dictions into empirical models makes the researcher’s quite de-
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manding. Which variables must a researcher use in order to
grasp and explain the functioning of the various institutions?
How is it possible to separate the factors which affect long-term
unemployment from the factors which affect it in the short
term? How can we capture the effects of the various shocks
which hit the economy?3.
1.2.1 Analysing interactions between labour
market institutions and macroeconomic shocks
Irrespective of the indicators that the researcher has chosen
to include in regressions, institutions alone cannot explain the
unemployment rate trend. Many other factor must be consid-
ered to reach a better understanding of the phenomenon. As
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) suggested, in order to explain
the unemployment trend in OECD countries it is important to
study interactions between different institutions and macroe-
conomic shocks.
These authors point out that unemployment rates show a pos-
itive trend which is very different from country to country. As
most institutions have always been there, even in a period of
low unemployment, they argue that the huge heterogeneity in
institutions could explain different levels of real unemployment,
but not its evolution over time. This is the reason why in their
analyses these authors introduce interactions between macroe-
conomic shocks and labour market institutions4. Theoretically,
these shocks - while interacting with institutions - could explain
both the positive trend and the heterogeneous movements in
3Factors, or shocksand short-term unemployment, as well as the factors affecting
aggregate demand, productivity and wages, i.e. shocks in the money supply or in
interest rates. See Nickell (1997)
4The shocks they consider are the following: interest rates, the severance pay (TFP)
growth rate and the factors which shift labour demand. According to Nickell (1997),
disregarding the inflation rate variations, these shocks are not stationary. In a different
analysis Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) measures shocks by means of time dummies.
The explanatory power of the model improves substantially.
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different countries’ unemployment rates. The same negative
shocks - which lead to an increase of the unemployment rate -
could have stronger or weaker, depending on the institutions’
absorption ability. More precisely, institutions can affect reac-
tions to shocks in two ways: an impact effect (magnitude) and
persistence (length)5.
In general terms, the following shocks have been considered:
• in the money supply, more precisely in factors that cause
changes in growth rate of the nominal money supply stock;
• in the productivity, as measured by total factors produc-
tivity;6
• in labour demand, as measured by residuals from a basic
regression;7
• in the price of imports, as measured by the variation in
the real price of imports weighted by trade shares.
• in the real interest rate.8
Except for interest rates, these shocks tend to be absorbed
quickly (that is, they are mean reverting and stationary).
5This explanation is at the core of isteresis theories.
6In early 1970s Europe, for example, experienced a sharp decrease in the factor
productivity growth. In five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Great Britain)
the rate fell from 5% in the 1960s to 2% in the 1970s. Since then, this rate has levelled
off. Similar conclusions can be drawn by looking to the EU-15. See Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000).
7This kind of shock might account for technical change, for example, labour adverse.
Let us think to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function Y = LαK1−α. Let
η = w/Yn be the rate between salary and labour marginal productivity. The share
of labour is a = η ∗ α. A reduction in the share of labour, a, could reflect both in a
reduction in the share of labour in the production function, α, or in a reduction of η.
Just to give you an idea, in 2000 the labour share in Europe was 10% lower than in the
1960s for the EU-5 and 8% lower for the EU-15. However, especially in the short run,
it could reflect a variation in the price of factors. See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
8Interest rates affect both short-term and long-term unemployment. Indeed, an
interest rate variation will affect the capital accumulation process, thus making labour
demand shift. In Europe, for example, interest rates recorded a positive trend in the
1960s and a negative one in the second half of the 1970s, whereas they became strongly
positive in the 1980s and 1990s. See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
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Results from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)’ work suggest that
the combination of macroeconomic shocks with labour market
rigidity seems to explain the general unemployment rate trend
as from 1960 and its variations across countries. However, their
results are sensitive to different specifications. For example,
results are less robust when considering institutions that varied
over time.
In a similar model, Nickell et al. (2005) consider how the change
in institutions - interacting with macroeconomic shocks - can
explain the unemployment rate deviation from the equilibrium
level. In particular, they account for institutions’ interactions
with macroeconomic shocks. In addition to the lagged depen-
dent variable, the basic model presents the dummies for each
country and time period, as well as a specific trend for each
country.9 The model is not very good at explaining data. For
these reasons, they also look at a dynamic simulation for each
country. The explanatory power of the model improves and
it is able to explain 50% of the inflation rate variations. For
example, the variation in unemployment benefits and taxes ac-
count for two thirds of long-term unemployment rate varia-
tions. Their final analysis considers the interaction between
institutional variables - represented by their mean in the pe-
riod - with macroeconomic shocks - represented by means of
dummies variables. By themselves, these interactions explain
data pretty well. However, when added to the baseline model,
their explanatory power decreases significantly. In authors’
view, the institution changes are able to explain the unem-
ployment pattern from the 1960s to the 1990s, whereas the
interactions between shocks - as measured by dummy variables
- and institutions do not contribute significantly to explain un-
employment rates across countries.
The choice of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) seems to be more
9See Baker et al. (2005) for a critical assessment of their model.
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correct as they measure macroeconomic shocks by means of
macroeconomic variables. The use of dummy variables to mea-
sure macroeconomic shocks, as in Nickell et al. (2005), could ac-
count for an effect which helps to better understand the process
(see Baccaro and Rei (2007); Baker et al. (2005)). In addition,
when introducing interactions, attention must be paid to the
selected variables, as well as interactions, since these choices
could influence final results. Further, as the work of Blan-
chard and Wolfers (2000) shows, the series of labour market
institutions are poorer than those available for macroeconomic
shocks.
Likewise, Fitoussi et al. (2000) develop a model which uses the
interactions between macroeconomic shocks and labour market
institutions. Even these authors are strongly convinced that a
model using only institutions is not enough to explain different
unemployment rate patterns across countries. They present -
inter alia - a regression which tests the assumption whereby
monetary policy is responsible for the higher unemployment
rates recorded in the 1990s. Their model can account only for
40% of the unemployment rate variability.
Conversely, Baccaro and Rei (2007)’s work pays specific atten-
tion to the type of data used (time-series-cross-section - TSCS)
and, hence, to the various problems which arise while using
different datasets (see below). The model starts with one of
the most powerful specification for supporting the deregulat-
ing view as it was used in the IMF (2003b) work - the study
with the strongest empirical evidence. In particular, as in the
IMF’s work, they consider the role played by monetary au-
thorities. They construct an index representing the central
banks’ independent role - an unusual approach for this kind
of works. A priori it is no clear which sign we can expect for
this variable. However, ceteris paribus, once it is considered
in its interaction with the degree of centralization in the wage
bargaining process, it should be negatively associated with the
10
unemployment rate.10 In some specifications, the model con-
tains interactions between each institutional variable and the
degree of centralization. The underlying idea is grasp the dif-
ferent ways in which institutions work in relation to different
types of capitalism. Furthermore, unlike previous works, they
do not include country-specific trend and they do not estimate
specific coefficients for few countries.11 In addition to institu-
tional variables, only the macroeconomic shocks represented by
interest rates are considered. No other interactions are taken
into account.12 Results do not confirm the view that, by re-
moving labour market institutions rigidity, unemployment can
be reduced. On the contrary, there is strong evidence for the
prominent role played by interest rates and central banks’ in-
dipendence. The major conclusion which can be drawn from
this work is that the unemployment rate is mostly affected by
restrictive macroeconomic policies and institutions which lead
to these policies.
A different approach is used by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
They believe that the consequences on different institutions
depend on the fact that the "world" is undergoing a phase of
high or low turbulence. In the former case, the unemployment
rates could be very different across countries. In fact, it is more
likely for unemployed people to lose their skills. Hence, in Eu-
rope, where unemployment benefits are higher, it is less likely
to find a job with a higher salary than benefits compared to
10According to the rational expectation theory, for example, central banks should not
directly influence the degree of employment and unemployment. Conversely, authors
suggest that central banks’ activity could become crucial when there is a centralized
wage bargaining process. In this case, authorities could reach their inflation target more
easily.
11According to Baker et al. (2005), it is not correct to include trends for each countries,
because in so doing, we can simply control an effect, without explaining anything.
Moreover, the choice to estimate different coefficients for some countries must be avoided
once the decision to pool is taken, unless - obviously - there are very good reasons. For
example, to distinguish between EU-15 and EU-25 countries.
12The choice to rely on five-year data drastically reduces the number of observations
available and - hence - the number of parameters which could be estimated.
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the United States, where these benefits are lower. In the latter
case, in a world of low turbulence, it is less likely for unem-
ployed people to lose their skills and it will be easier to find a
job with a salary higher than the reservation wage. In this sit-
uation, the divergence between Europe and the United States
will decrease. However, as argued by Nickell et al. (2005), this
model does not explain why unemployment rate followed so
many different trends across European countries.
To recap, in all these works different macroeconomic shocks
affect unemployment according to the country institutional
framework. Even though these works do not offer insights on
causal relationships, and sometimes are even contradicting, by
emphasizing the role of interactions between institutions and
macroeconomic shocks in econometric specifications, they high-
light the ability of different institutional arrangements to ab-
sorb and react the shocks which hit the economy. Furthermore
they also underline the need to control institutions, such as
central banks which - in spite of playing an important role -
have often been neglected.
1.2.2 Interactions among labour market in-
stitutions
It is equally important to consider how institutions interact one
another. Some authors suggest that there is complementarity
among reforms. For example, starting from a wage/price set-
ting model (WS/PS), it is possible to show how institutions’
interactions affect the unemployment rate, through two mech-
anisms:
• the interaction between factors affecting the slope of the
WS/PS curves with those which affect the position of
these two curves. For example, a cut in the unemploy-
ment benefits (that make the WS shift downwards) will
12
have a stronger impact: i) the flatter the PS is (for exam-
ple as a result of a milder regulation in the product mar-
kets) ii) the flatter the WS is (for example, when there
is a weaker unions’ power) because the feedback effect
of higher unemployment rate is lower in terms of higher
wages demanded.
• the starting point. Reforms are expected to have greater
effects where the employment rate is higher (employment-
friendly). In other words, the labour demand marginal
effect of a reduction in real wages will be higher where
employment is already higher rather than low.
These considerations lead some authors to argue that there ex-
ist complementarities and synergies among reforms (i.e.,Fitoussi
et al. (1998); Orszag and Snower (1998)), and the effects of all
reforms considered in isolation are weaker than the effects of
all reforms jointly achieved. Even in these studies, the ma-
jor problem is related to the interactions to be selected, and
particularly the basis on which this decision should rest. Why
should we include an interaction and leave aside another. 13
In fact, it is very difficult to consider all interactions because
one will soon reach an over-parameterized model. In addition,
the fact of considering an interaction instead of another could
well explain the experience of an individual country, but not of
all the others. As underlined by Bassanini and Ernst (2002), it
could be worthwhile to consider interactions in a systemic way,
which means grasping the effects on an institution when its en-
tire institutional framework varies. To this end, they create a
variable representing the systemic effect by summing up all the
possible interactions. The introduction of this variable in their
baseline regression affects the direct coefficient of some institu-
tions (for example, the coefficient on the EPL variable become
13Step-wise regressions could be a solution but even in this case results may be affected
by the choice of variables to be added/removed in the various steps.
13
significant, as well as the unionization rate). Furthermore, the
coefficients on interactions are significant, supporting the view
of complementary reforms, and the model well fits data and
explains 92% of the unemployment rate variability as against
74% in a model without interactions.
The main conclusion drawn is that a reform package will bring
greater benefits than piecemeal reforms - hence it makes little
sense to focus only on few specific institutions.
1.2.3 Interactions with product and financial
markets
Another aspect that deserves attention is the interaction be-
tween labour market institutions and product/financial mar-
kets, as recent papers have pointed out.
In their theoretical paper, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in-
vestigate how the effect of deregulation in the product markets
works together with deregulation in the labour market. In their
study, monopolistic competition in product market determines
rent whereas the degree of labour market deregulation deter-
mines the share of rent which occurs to workers. The main
results they get are the following:
• the direct effects of deregulation in product markets re-
duce the rent. However, workers gain more as consumers
as they lose part of the rent. In the long run, deregulation
leads to higher real wage and less unemployment;
• the direct effects of labour market deregulation are gains
for workers - less unemployment and higher real wages in
the long run - but in the short run it is possible to have
higher unemployment and lower real wages;
• the deregulation of labour market is feasible when it is
accomplished with product market deregulation.The re-
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duction in the rent simply reduces the incentive to fight
to share it.
Only a few empirical works, however, try to account for these
interdependencies. Nicoletti et al. (2000) and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2005) show the tendency of labour market regula-
tion to go hand in hand with product market regulation. In
countries where product markets are highly regulated, such as
Italy and Greece, workers tend to be more protected. More-
over, they also find that there exist important complementar-
ities between reforms in product and labour markets. Amable
and Gatti (2006) show that engaging in a process of prod-
uct market deregulation yields an implicit labour market re-
form, leading to a more intense turnover on the labour mar-
ket. This mechanism is exacerbated by increased competition
on the product market but is dampened by redundancy pay-
ments. Similarly, in Amable and Gatti (2004), they develop a
dynamic efficiency wage framework where deregulation in prod-
uct and labour markets boosts labour turnover and reduces job
security; this mechanism pushes the incentive compatible real
wage schedule upwards and may generate aggregate employ-
ment losses. Finally, the work of Griffith et al. (2007) shows
that the significant product market deregulation experienced in
the 1990s by some OECD countries was associated with an in-
crease in competition and in aggregate employment. They also
find that, in countries with higher levels of collective bargain-
ing coverage and/or union density, the increase in employment
is more marked. Their results, however, focused on average
effects across the whole economy and might be less likely with
reforms affecting only a small number of sectors (as individuals
might lose both as workers and as consumers).
Recent papers have also pointed out the existence of inter-
actions between labour and financial markets imperfections
(Wasmer andWeil (2004); Bertola and Koeniger (2007);Bertola
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(2004); Acemoglu et al. (2001)). Some of these studies chal-
lenge the standard view by pointing out that in some cases
deregulation may give rise to perverse effects on employment.
Credit market frictions hinder investment and lower capital
stock in the economy which, in turn, lead to a lower employ-
ment level if labour and capital are complementary or if labour
market imperfections make real wages downward-rigid.
The main insight from this strand of literature is the need to
control interdependencies between labour and product/financial
markets as, even in this case, there could be important com-
plementarities in reforms.
1.2.4 Dynamic of labour markets
Alternatively, another way to look at labour market institu-
tions is analyse the equilibrium unemployment as the outcome
of the matching process which affects the short-term dynamics
by which the long-run equilibrium is achieved. This flow ap-
proach mainly focuses on the transition between labour market
states (i.e. employment vs. non-employment). In so doing, it
is possible to analyse the consequences of various shocks on
firm decisions to hire/fire workers, for example in the presence
or absence of firings costs. Firing costs, by lowering both hir-
ing and dismissals, may lead to a less aggressive dynamic in
employment, especially in the short term, and concurrently in-
crease the average period of employment, as well as the average
duration of unemployment. However, even in these models, it
is crucial to consider the configuration of labour market insti-
tutions as a whole (Bertola and Rogerson (1997)).
There is also the risk that marginal workers and categories (i.e.
women, young workers) will be affected by reforms differently
from other workers. As a consequence, the standard dereg-
ulation view should be analyzed as against wage disparities
and employment opportunities for marginal workers, as well
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as its implication for inactivity and joblessness. For example,
Schmitt and Wadsworth (2002) argue that deregulation does
not necessary yield better employment opportunities for these
marginal categories, and is indeed associated with greater wage
disparities and higher inactivity for marginal workers. A se-
ries of papers have also focused on the impact of deregulation
on participation and employment opportunities for marginal
workers, providing some evidence of a substitution effect be-
tween unemployment and inactivity. For example, Faggio and
Nickell (2005) and Bicakova (2005) investigate the institutional
and macroeconomic determinants of inactivity for low-skilled
prime age men. Faggio and Nickell (2005) main conclusion is
that there exists a trade-off between wage opportunities and
social transfers: labour supply of less skilled workers is hit by
the decreasing relative wage which may discourage and eventu-
ally lead to quit the labour force, low-skilled workers. Bicakova
(2005), who proposes a comparative analysis of joblessness de-
terminants for prime age men in the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, points out that for this category of work-
ers, inactivity is larger than unemployment in the first two
countries, whereas the opposite holds true for France.
Cross-country regression of unemployment rates on institutions
are not able to capture important dynamics in labour markets.
As these works on labour dynamics underline, different institu-
tions may have different impact not only on the unemployment
level, but also on the short/long-term equilibrium that could be
achieved. In fact, marginal workers and weak categories may be
affected differently by the various institutional arrangements.
1.3 The data
In recent years, several databases to study labour market in-
stitutions have been developed: i the World Bank Regula-
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tion database, to evaluate the regulation costs; ii the OECD
database, to build quantitative indicators characterising the
reform progress; iii the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benetti So-
cial Reforms Database, to categorize reforms according to their
expected effects on labour market flexibility; iv Chor and Free-
man database, to measure labour practice; the ECFIN LABREF
Database, to track reform measures over time.14
In addition to the theoretical models and econometrics specifi-
cations, the choice of dataset represents another crucial aspect
that a researcher has to master in order to realize robust anal-
ysis. For example, the possibility of knowing how information
was collected contribute to properly select the variables of in-
terest, as well as the right model, thus concurrently allow the
researcher to control the robustness of different model specifi-
cations. Otherwise, the risks are use inadequate techniques or
not fully exploit information in the dataset.
In particular, when studying labour market institutions, the
main difficulty a researcher faces is define the criteria to create
indexes according to which a country is deregulated or regu-
lated. Indeed, cataloguing different features of country insti-
tutional settings (i.e union density and coverage rate) homo-
geneously, in relation to the limited number of cross-country
observations, is a difficult task. In general terms, it is com-
mon practice to rely on group of country observations, dis-
tinguishing between liberal economy or neo-corporativism, but
this will not allow to account for all possible combinations of
institutional arrangements, such as union density, employment
protection law, collective bargaining coverage, etc. Further-
more, country legislations are complex and relevant aspects of
job-security provisions - such as the willingness of labour courts
to process appeals by fired workers or the interpretation pro-
14A useful service is offered by IZA Data Service Center, which facilitates the search
for datasets which are relevant for labour economists, and is available at metadata.iza.
org.
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vided by judges on the rather vague notion of ‘fair cause’ for
termination of employment contracts - are difficult to quan-
tify. (Autor (2003); Bertola (2005, 2008); Ichino and Riphahn
(2005)). Therefore, as long as countries have different combi-
nation of institutions, great risks are involved when creating
cross-country sorting through aggregate indexes(Nardo et al.
(2005)).
Besides rank-based indicators, legal and survey-based measures
have also been constructed (i.e,Bertola et al. (2000); Di Tella
and MacCulloch (2005)). However, even these indicators must
be treated cautiously since survey-based indicators may depend
on economic conditions, whereas legal indicators may reflect
the political-economic influences on the judicial process (Ichino
et al. (2003)).
Some caution must also be paid when looking at data which
provide information on fixed-term contracts. These contracts
imply important differences in term of costs and conditions
compared with open-ended contracts. When studying the ef-
fect of firing costs and unemployment benefits, we should not
neglect the differences. As Freeman (2005) suggested, the pro-
cess of liberalization of fixed-term contracts, while maintaining
firing costs, could lead to perverse effects. It is important to
underline that most studies which used the indexes created by
the OECD could reach wrong conclusions if they do not dis-
tinguish between firing costs and fixed-term contracts. Theory
suggests that effects of these two components on productivity
and employment might be different.
In the light of these macro-dataset shortcomings, but without
relinquishing the analysis macroeconomic approach, it appears
reasonable to study labour market institutions by also relying
on microeconomic data. In particular, the researcher may ana-
lyze how firms, unions and workers, along with other groups, in-
teract one another in sufficiently complex systems which repro-
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duce the main features of macro systems (Freeman (2005)). In
fact, there exist adequately complex organizations which could
provide indications on the functioning of institutions at a more
aggregate level. For example, to judge whether labour mar-
ket rules produce worse employment outcomes, the researcher
could compare and contrast employment in firms with more
or less rigid internal rules. While problems are incurred when
generalising from micro-analysis to the whole economy, useful
suggestions may still be inferred from the evidence of a little
portion of a whole system.15
1.3.1 Time series cross section (TSCS)
Very often, when studying labour market institutions, researchers
use techniques created to analyse panel data. However, in cer-
tain cases, it would be better to rely on tricks available for
time-series-cross-section dataset (TSCS), which consists of a
sequence of time series observed for different units - as in a
panel dataset - where the value of time observations, T, is
rather high in relation to the number of units. There is no
a clear cut line. In general terms, one digit panel dataset for
T is considered. Nevertheless the notations are equal and the
distinction between these two types of datasets appears rele-
vant, since it allows to neglect some issues which are involved
in panel data analysis while creating new concerns to which
attention must be paid.
Generally, in cross-country analysis of labour market institu-
tions, three problems arise:
15The idea is to follow the approach of insider econometrics. In this kind of studies,
in order to better understand the different incentives in human resource management,
analyses are performed by relying on dataset collected through rigorous work. More
precisely, in order to analyse the effects of different incentive schemes, the analyst makes
reference to a series of guiding principle: identifying a restricted portion of the produc-
tive system which could be modelled empirically; visiting the (most important) working
sites; interviewing different individuals so as to get different viewpoints; accurate col-
lection of panel data on production, technology and organizational practices.
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• simultaneous correlation of error terms among coun-
tries: when there is correlation among errors in different
observations, it is generally assumed to be constant over
time and be present in a certain point (for example a neg-
ative oil shock which affects all economies at the same
time);16
• autocorrelation in the residuals: by mostly relying on
dynamic models, we can grasp autocorrelation. Neverthe-
less, in this case, attention must be paid to the remaining
autocorrelation, otherwise estimation will be biased;17
• specific heteroschedasticity for each country: in
this situation the most important decision is whether "pool
or not to pool". The easy way to master heterogeneity is
to introduce fixed effects, which means a dummy variable
for each country. The other extreme case is to consider
a specific coefficient, βi, for each country (random coeffi-
cient model). Although both methods are correct, some
doubts arise for intermediate solutions which are more dif-
ficult to accept, unless they rely on theoretical ground.18
In this connection, the issue whether fixed effects should be
included in TSCS models or not arises in most comparative
16In that case it could be possible to use FGLS. But, in case of simultaneous corre-
lation and heteroschedasticity , it seems more correct to use robust standard error for
panel data (PCSEs) instead of standard OLS errors. The latter stems directly from
the traditional formula for OLS standard error when Gauss-Markov hypotheses are in-
fringed. For the former, the formula is a bit different from the procedure of White
(1982), as the errors computed in this way can account for heteroschedasticity but not
for autocorrelation.
17The usual approach with panel data is use an instrumental variable (IV) estimator
(Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991)). Kiviet (1995) takes a different
approach by estimating the bias and correcting the estimation accordingly. Sometimes
this procedure may prove better than the IV estimators, but is somewhat hard to
implement. However, Beck and Katz (2007) show that in the case of TSCS data, i.e.
with values of T greater than 10, 20 or even 30, Kiviet correction or IV methods are
not worth their costs.
18For example, as previously noted, when analysing European countries, it is rea-
sonable to estimate a different coefficient for the new European Union Member States
(Beck and Katz (2004))
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empirical studies. It is possible to test for the inclusion of such
effects. However, Beck and Katz (2004, 2007) state that F
test for the significance of fixed effects may be too liberal in
rejecting the null of no effects since rejection is more likely in
the presence of many units.
Another important concern is the fact that the inclusion of
country fixed effects precludes the inclusion of time-invariant
or slowly-changing variables as independent variables. Distin-
guishing between their influence and the influence of omitted
country-specific variables might be difficult. If fixed effects are
not included in the model, the time-invariant variables will
carry the weight of all country specific factors. To overcome
this problem, Plümper and Troeger (2007) propose a procedure
for analyzing the effect of time-invariant variables in a model
including fixed effects. Their procedure has three stages: (i)
estimate a fixed-effect model; (ii) regress the unit effects on the
time-invariant variables; (iii) re-estimate the first stage includ-
ing the error term of the second stage (XTFEVD procedure).
Their Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the fixed effect
vector decomposition (XTFEVD) estimator is the least biased
estimator when time-variant and time-invariant variables are
correlated with the unit effects.
Finally, the researcher must not use methods for stationary
series with non stationary ones (spurious regression). In fact,
even for panel data traditional techniques (trend, correlograms,
unit root tests) are available, usually applied to time series.
There is also a growing literature that tries to adapt these
techniques to the case of TSCS data (Levin et al. (2002), Beck
and Katz (2004)). A very careful work in coping with these
problems is Amable et al. (2007). The authors present results
of regressions based on three different estimators: PCSE, GLS
and FEVD. In addition, they also build time series data to ac-
count for the annual evolution of employment protection leg-
islation (EPL) and use new data for unemployment insurance
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net replacement rates.
1.3.2 How to interpret results?
Even after selecting the appropriate econometric techniques for
the available data, non trivial problems persist to discover the
causal relationship among variables. It is important to under-
line that regression simply provide indications to the researcher
for the capacity of a variable to explaining the path of another
variable. This, however, does not mean that a variable causes
the other. For example, Baker et al. (2005) noted how in the
OECD analysis of 1997 it is reported "that there exists wide
consensus in recognizing that unemployment rates are closely
connected with the generosity of unemployment benefits", thus
neglecting the possibility for governments - faced with a pe-
riod of high unemployment - to increase benefits to manage
the social crisis.19
In econometrics, this way of looking at things is called reverse
causality or, in other words, endogeneity problems. It means
that variables influence one another and there is a feedback pro-
cess. For example, a positive relationship between replacement
ratio and unemployment could in fact reflect both government
propensity to increase benefits when unemployment is high and
an effective influence of this institutional variable to determine
high unemployment rate (because, for example, higher benefits
lead to a growth of the reserve salary).
To address this issue, there is not just a single way. Rather than
taking institutions for granted, a new strand of research at-
tempts to understand institutions as a result of an endogenous
19Bredgaard and Larsen (2008) show how such a reform - by decreasing temporary
workers’ contractual power of temporary workers - may reduce the unemployment rate
on the one hand, but, on the other, may lead to higher turnover since firms consider
more profitable to fire workers, even though the productivity level is greater than wages.
In so doing, they can avoid the additional wage costs arising from employing permanent
workers. See also Cahuc and Michel (1996).
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process (Acemoglu et al. (2005); Arpaia and Mourre (2005);
Saint-Paul (2000)). On the one hand, it is possible to rely on
instrumental variables (IV) and methods of estimation (i.e.,
GMM). For example, this is the choice of Bassanini and Ernst
(2002) who rely on lagged variable. In general, other instru-
ments may be available, such as political and ideological (Botero
et al. (2004)) and religious tools (Algan and Cahuc (2006)). An
alternative solution could be a Granger test for the series. How-
ever, caution must be used even with Granger tests, as these
tests offer indications on the ability of some variables to predict
the behaviour of another variable, but it does not imply that
a variable cause another one in the economic sense.
As these discussions suggest, the researcher with mild/strong
priors may reach incorrect conclusions, either by applying to his
dataset inappropriate techniques, or by interpreting simple cor-
relation in cross-country regression as casual relationships. To
really understand how institutions work, the researcher must
make greater efforts to discover the data generating process. As
the next section highlights, an important step in this direction
is represented by experiments and simulations with artificial
agents.
1.4 Experiment and computational eco-
nomics
Instead of relying only on empirical data, it could be useful to
rely on analysis based on experiments(EXP) (Kagel and Roth
(1995)) and simulation with artificial agents (ACE)(Neugart
(2008), Tesfatsion and Pingle (2003)).
Experiments analyse individuals’ behaviours - and hence the
emergence of some regularities - by means of simulations, in
general using computer, in order to study their choices in differ-
ent situations (number of interactions, type of communications
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and sequence choices). Conversely, simulations with artificial
agents study the relationship between micro and macro-level
by means of totally artificial experiments. There are no hu-
man beings involved in the analysis and thanks to computer
program it is possible to replicate a vast series of human be-
haviours (from stupidity to complex ways of thinking).
The distinction between the two is pure didactics. There are
many growing complementarities between these two worlds (Con-
tini et al. (2006)). The most important aspect to stress here
is that both EXP and ACE refuse the classic assumption of
rational economic agent, emphasizing the role played by het-
erogeneity, bounded rationality and learning. In particular, as
they allow to discover the data generating process, they enable
the researcher to reproduce all possible histories or at least to
understand under which conditions a realization (story) came
out. In fact, a key advantage is the possibility of mastering
crucial aspects of the economic environment, such as tech-
nology, market structure and trends in economic fundamen-
tals. Moreover, in all experiments institutions are exogenously
changed, thus making causal inferences possible. This is per-
haps the most important advantage of laboratory experiments.
For example, in the case of an institution such as the mini-
mum wage, an experiment allows to observe wages before and
after the minimum wage is introduced, while keeping every-
thing else constant. In reality, governments choose institutions
endogenously in response to current or anticipated economic
conditions on the market (Falk and Huffman (2007)). As the
previous section shows, econometric strategies - such as instru-
menting for policy changes - may mitigate the problem, but
cannot achieve the exogenous variation provided by laboratory
experiments.
Finally, experiments and simulations also allow to observe the
impact of institutions on the behaviours of individual economic
agents. In field data, changes in micro-behaviour must be typ-
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ically inferred from changes in aggregate outcome.
There are also some disadvantages inherent in these two meth-
ods. The most important is probably the limited generalizabil-
ity which, however, is a criticism that can be levelled at any
dataset. Another important concern which is often raised is
that they may be too simple and missing important aspects,
which could also be relevant (Falk and Huffman (2007)). How-
ever, just as any economic model, simplicity should not always
be seen as a defect but also as an effort to grasp all the features
which are essential to tackle a problem. These limitations do
not invalidate the potential of EXP and ACE, but make them
a complement rather than a substitute for field data.
For example, Neugart (2004) develops a model that allows to
analyze the impact of labour market policies (macro-level) -
training aids - starting from individual decisions. More pre-
cisely, he shows how the unemployment rate decreases thanks
to the benefits that lead workers to invest more in capital ac-
cumulation. The major consequence is that workers are places
in a situation in which they are able to perform new jobs. In
other words, these policies can reduce frictions in the labour
market.
In their laboratory experiment, Falk et al. (2006a) study the
effect of the introduction of a minimum wage on salaries paid
by firms and on workers’ reservation wages. The main result of
their study is an increase of real wage after the introduction of
a minimum wage. This result is related to workers’ reservation
wages and what is considered fair wages: wages which were
considered acceptable in the absence of a minimum wage are
perceived - after the introduction of this institutional rule -
low and unfair, and therefore no longer accepted. Falk et al.
(2006a) also study the removal of a minimum wage. Contrary
to standard economic wisdom, the effect is not symmetric and,
even after the removal of the minimum wage, real wages stay
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close to the previous level. This means that the minimum wage
has permanent effects on real wages. These results, considered
altogether, show that the minimum wage affects the reservation
wages in a complex way. The possibility of identifying these
effects rest on two important features which are not possible
to achieve with field data: the direct observation of reservation
wages and the comparison between a labour market with and
without a minimum wage, while keeping all the other variables
fixed.
Falk et al. (2008) investigate the economic consequences of em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL) in a competitive labour
market with incomplete contracts. Their findings provide in-
sights into the circumstances in which EPL performs well or
poorly. In particular, the impact of EPL depends on the flex-
ibility of the contractual forms available to companies and on
the extent to which firms can observe performance and reward
or punish using contingent compensation. With incomplete
contracts, the firing threat is crucial for market efficiency and
dismissal barriers worsen performance by hindering this incen-
tive device and discouraging the relationship formation. On
the contrary, with greater flexibility in contractual instruments
- for example under the form of bonus pay - the negative effects
of dismissal barriers on incentive and efficiency is offset almost
completely. This work shows to what extent market outcomes
are the result of a complex interplay between contracts and
institutions and to what extent it is consistent with the em-
pirical literature, which sometimes records zero or moderate
effects of EPL on the various types of outcomes. In particular,
it highlights how labour contract flexibility is relevant to con-
sider whether dismissal barriers have a strong or weak effect
on market performance.
Finally, a study of Falk et al. (2006b) uses laboratory exper-
iments to investigate two issues related to workfare. Firstly,
it demonstrates that - in line with economic theory - work re-
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quirements shift the individual labour supply curve downward,
thus establishing a positive workfare incentive effect. Secondly,
it tests the political support to workfare. In an experiment
where subjects could vote in favour or against workfare - be-
fore knowing whether they will be personally affected or not -
tremendous support was recorded for workfare: roughly 84% of
subjects voted for the imposition of a work requirement. The
main motivation for supporting workfare was primarily social,
in the sense that people indicated fairness, social rules or the
desire to punish free riders.
In summary, these studies highlight how EXP and ACE are
powerful tools for studying labour market institutions. In order
to develop more realistic priors about how people and institu-
tions operate in aggregate economies, we should make greater
use of these two modes of analysis (Freeman (2005)). While
the leap from laboratory experiments and simulations to ac-
tual institutions is great, they represent a useful complement
to field evidence as they allow to make clear causal inferences;
to observe variables which can be never observed in reality, as
well as the impact of institutions in greater detail than on the
field.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper mainly reviewed the empirical literature on labour
market institutions, in order to evaluate the labour market
rigidity account, also known as ‘OECD-IMF’ orthodoxy, ac-
cording to which labour institutions and work arrangements
are the cause of economic distress and poor performance. In
spite of a growing number of economists who question the or-
thodox view, many studies conclude - although to different
extents - that evidence supports the view that labour market
institutions have mattered in determining the unemployment
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pattern across OECD countries since the 1960s.
Different factors explain the adherence to this view. The first
reason is that many hold strong priors that labour market oper-
ate better in the absence of institutions, which often have lead
them to interpret simple correlation between labour institu-
tion variables and unemployment as causal relationship. This
is evidenced by the fact that detailed analyses of the most in-
fluential cross-country statistical studies have recorded results
which are very sensitive to the nature of the variables used, the
time period and model specifications.
The second reason is mainly related to the cross-country data
and econometric techniques used in the analysis. One of the
main concerns related to the dataset on institutions and labour
arrangements is that they are fairly poor compared to the
data available for macroeconomic shocks and do not allow to
capture all the country heterogeneity in the institutional set-
tings. Therefore, a risk is involved in creating aggregated in-
dexes by simply ranking the various countries. When studying
labour market institutions by means of cross-country regres-
sions, there is also the risk of using inadequate techniques.
In certain cases, for example, a researcher would rather rely
on tricks available for time-series-cross-section datasets, which
are similar to panel dataset but with a rather high time ob-
servation value. A researcher must be aware that, while TSCS
and panel data share a common notation, they differ and imply
different challenges.
Therefore, in order to improve our understanding of labour
market institutions and their effects on unemployment and
economic performance, new investigations relying on micro-
analyses of firms and workers, as well as human subject and
artificial experiments, seem necessary. Even though there could
be problems in generalizing from the micro-level to the whole
economy, the analysis of adequately complex organizations may
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really provide indications on the functioning of institutions at
aggregate level. Furthermore, as in market experiments, the
impact of institutions on individual agents’ behaviours can
be observed. Market experiments and simulations have also
the important advantage to allow exogenous changes in insti-
tutions, thus allowing to discover causal relationships. This
problem may be mitigated by econometric strategies, such as
instrumenting for policy changes, but with experiments we can
also control other crucial aspects of the economic environment,
such as technology and market structure.
Probably the results stemming from these new lines of research
will not settle the debate on labour market institutions, but
they might be helpful to reach a more shared view.
As further cross-country regressions will not be decisive, this
study suggests to perform analyses relying more on sophisti-
cated data and TSCS techniques, as well as on expensive hu-
man subject and artificial experiments.
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Chapter 2
Work arrangements
and firm
innovativeness: is
there any
relationship?
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between labour mar-
ket flexibility - proxied by the proportion of temporary and
part-time workers - and firms’ innovative ability, as measured
by the percentage of new products in total sales. On the one
hand, ‘more flexibility’ (i.e. a higher labour turnover) might be
favourable to a firm’s innovation potential. Besides having (po-
tential) wage savings, larger inflow of new personnel may enrich
the pool of firm innovative ideas. On the other hand, higher
work flexibility may also have some drawbacks: permanently
high rate of people entering and leaving a firm may diminish
1
social cohesion and trust, and increase the probability of op-
portunistic behaviour. Results suggest that higher percentages
of part-time workers are associated with a higher propensity
to innovate, especially for firms in high-tech sectors, whereas
results on other work arrangements are rather mixed.
2.1 Introduction
The majority of studies on labour market institutions examines
the relationship existing between these institutions and unem-
ployment. Although very important, concentrating on this as-
pect implies neglecting other equally relevant elements. There
is still little focus in the existing micro-economic literature on
the effect of work arrangements on firms’ ability to innovate.
On the contrary, we claim that labour market institutions may
have a significant impact on firms’ innovativeness.
Similarly, virtually all the economic literature on firm level de-
terminants of innovation has dealt with issues such as corporate
size, the degree of competition, the extent of protection granted
by patents, thus neglecting organisational factors and human
resource management practices which may provide a positive
contribution to firm innovation performance. As a first at-
tempt to fill this gap, we propose an empirical investigation
aimed at examining the effect of work arrangements on firms’
ability to invest and introduce new technologies. In particular,
this study relies on a panel of Italian manufacturing firms to
investigate the relationship between labour market flexibility -
proxied by the proportion of temporary and part-time workers
- and firms’ innovative capacity, as measured by the percent-
age of new products in corporate total sales. As we want to
adopt a firm perspective, the focus will be on flexibility at firm
level (both internal and external), thus ignoring - insofar as
possible - other labour market features (i.e. labour mobility
across sectors and regions). The reasons for distinguishing be-
tween different kinds of flexibility rely on the assumptions - as
argued in various theoretical papers - that their consequences
for firm performance could be very different. On the one hand,
one could argue that ‘more flexibility’ (i.e. a higher labour
turnover) might be favourable for firms’ innovation potential.
Larger inflow of new people may enrich the pool of firms’ in-
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novative ideas and open up new networks. Moreover, it will be
easier for a firm to replace less productive people with more
productive ones.
On the other hand, higher labour flexibility may also have some
disadvantages. A permanent high rate of people entering and
leaving a firm may diminish social cohesion and trust and in-
crease the probability of opportunistic behaviour. Long-term
and trust-based relations may instead be required to develop
tacit organizational competence and skills so as to improve
productivity and performance by selecting and allocating com-
petent people. In addition, such flexibility will diminish social
capital, thus concurrently forcing firms to invest more money
in monitoring and controlling (Naaspted and Storn (2005)),
making the so-called ‘hold up’ problem even more relevant: as
labour contracts are expected to be shorter, employer and em-
ployees may be reluctant to really invest in the labour relations
(Kleinknecht et al. (2006)).
However, we expect consequences to be very different depend-
ing on firms’ activities. In fact, the loss of social capital might
be a much more serious concern for innovative and knowledge
intensive firms. In that case, much of the knowledge created by
firms’ activities is embedded, to some extent, in the employees’
human capital and, therefore, employees are not simply inter-
changeable with those outside the firm. In addition, the risk of
revealing trade secrets and technological knowledge could dis-
courage firm investments in R&D and innovation. For that rea-
son, throughout our empirical analysis we will present results
for firms in low-tech and high-tech industries. We will pro-
gressively use the dataset panel structure. Firstly, we adopt a
cross-section Tobit model which accounts for the fact that firms
are either innovative or not, and for those which are innova-
tive the extent to which they are so (Mohnen et al. (2006)).
This strategy allows us to keep selectivity problems under con-
trol. In recent years a number of panel estimators have been
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suggested for sample selection models, where both the selec-
tion equation and equation of interest contain individual ef-
fects which are correlated with explanatory variables. Among
these, we choose to rely on the estimator proposed by Rochina-
Barrachina (1999) which extends Heckman’s two-step estima-
tor deriving an expression for the selectivity correction term
for two different time periods.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
will briefly discuss different types of flexible labour, whereas in
section 3 we will give a review of the literature on studies that
either theoretically or empirically attempt to investigate the
effect of work arrangement on firms’ productivity and ability
to innovate. Subsequently, after a description of the Italian
labour market in section 4, and of the data we used in section
5, in section 6 we present the econometric model and results.
The final section contains our comments and conclusions.
2.2 Labour flexibility: what does it
mean? What does it imply?
In order to outline how different work arrangements might af-
fect firms’ performance, in this section we will describe different
forms of flexible labour.
Labour market flexibility can be divided into three broad cat-
egories
- market flexibility which refers to the flexibility of the whole
labour market (labour mobility, wage flexibility)
- external flexibility which refers to the numerical flexibil-
ity of labour to the firm’s needs (hiring and dismissals,
temporary contracts, private manpower agencies)
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- internal flexibility which refers to the notion of firm inter-
nal flexibility (staff who was moved to a different depart-
ment within the same firm)1.
Market flexibility refers to the degree to which wages are ad-
justed to clear the market (wage flexibility), and to the degree
to which people move between jobs, occupations, industries and
geographical areas (labour mobility). We expect, for example,
that there are intrinsic differences in work mobility according
to different features of the skill job requirements among sec-
tors, as well as a different degree of wage flexibility related to
the strength of labour organizations.
Despite the institutional availability of different arrangements,
firms are ultimately responsible for flexibility and the degree
to which it is implemented. If firms do not choose to put into
practice these working schemes, it makes very little sense to
talk about flexibility. Our aim is to analyse external/internal
flexibility and its consequences on innovation as used by firms.
External flexibility (or numerical flexibility) concerns the labour
quantitative adaptation to firms’ requirements by easily hir-
ing or dismissing, as well as by means of temporary contracts.
These are often called ‘low road’ practices, leading to higher
staff turnover and to (possibly) low-trust labour relations (Kleinknecht
et al. (2006)).
Internal flexibility is generally identified with functional flexi-
bility, that implies the elimination of horizontal and/or vertical
1The most famous distinction of labour market flexibility is given by Atikinson
(Atinkison (1984), Atinkison and Meager (1986)). He distinguishes flexibility depending
on where flexibility takes place (inside or outside the firm) and how it is developed func-
tionally, numerically or financially. It includes a notion of internal numerical flexibility,
sometimes known as working-time flexibility or temporal flexibility. This flexibility is
achieved by adjusting working hours or schedules of workers already employed within
the firm. This includes part-time, flexible working hours/shifts (including night shifts
and weekend shifts), working time accounts, leaves, over-time, etc. Another form of
flexibility that is worth mentioning is locational flexibility or flexibility of place (Wal-
lace (2003)). This entails employees working outside the usual workplace such as home
based work, outworkers or teleworkers.
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boundaries between job classifications and the development of
multi-skilled employees. Since changes in skill requirements are
achieved mainly through training, internal flexibility does not
yield wage cost savings and, on the contrary, could even lead
to a significant increase of these costs. In order to emphasize
the labour qualitative adaptation to the companies’ changing
needs, these are often called ‘high road’ practices2. However,
there is also a notion of internal numerical (quantitative) flex-
ibility, sometimes known as working-time flexibility, achieved
by adjusting working hours or schedules of workers already em-
ployed within the firm. This includes part-time, overtime, flex-
ible working hours, working time accounts, seasonal changes,
leaves. Even though the objectives are different from func-
tional flexibility, flexible working time arrangements and leave
schemes can be used to accommodate working hour preferences
and enhance loyalty, enabling workers to match care and other
responsibilities along with work responsibility, as well as train-
ing or educational breaks (Houseman (2001)).
As this paper focuses on firm flexibility, we will only analyse
the effects of external and internal quantitative flexibility. Al-
though it would be extremely valuable to master internal qual-
itative flexibility as well, the questionnaire does not provide
such information.
2Labour market flexibility is generally perceived to exist in order to facilitate em-
ployers’ needs. However, it can also be used as a method to enable workers to adjust
working life and working hours to their own needs. These arrangements include leave
schemes for maternity/paternity reasons, family or educational leaves, and are opposed
to those which have been developed to accommodate employers’ needs, such as unusual
hours, over-time and temporary contracts. From this perspective, part-time work, flexi-
ble working schedule, and early retirement can be thought to reconcile both sides’ needs.
See (Chung (2006)).
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2.3 Literature Review
As soon as works on unemployment and labour market institu-
tions started (Lazear (1990)), the complexity of this relation-
ship emerged. After decades of studies, works, conferences and
policies, no clear conclusion has been reached yet, nor it has
been possible to limit the domain of analysis. Recently, how-
ever, a growing interest has been shown with reference to the
effects of work arrangements on firms’ productivity and ability
to innovate.
Cahuc and Postel Vinay (2002) showed that more regulated
labour markets induce human capital accumulation by increas-
ing the proportion of skilled workers, thus leading to increased
productivity and growth. They suggest that any decrease in
the minimum wage should be probably matched by appropri-
ate educational, industrial or employment subsidies in order
to compensate the possible welfare losses arising from lowering
this measure.
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) showed that, in non-competitive
labour markets, the existence of minimum wages can increase
firms’ investments in training, since it compresses the wage
structure. The intuition behind this outcome is that minimum
wage makes it more expensive for firms to employ unskilled
workers because they will obtain a wage level higher than the
competitive level. Hence, if firms provide training to workers
whose productivity is below the minimum, they do not have
to increase wages so that firms are the residual claimants of
increased productivity.
According to Kleinknecht (1998), removing labour market rigidi-
ties may be beneficial in the short term, but it could become
harmful in the long run since more flexibility on the labour mar-
ket discourages product and process innovation, thus reducing
productivity growth. In addition, softer employment protec-
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tion and more flexible wage setting will give extra advantage to
non-innovative firms versus innovative firms. In line with this
assumption, Bassanini and Ernst (2002) found a negative rela-
tionship between labour market flexibility and R&D intensity
in industries with more cumulative knowledge base. The work
of Kilicaslan and Taymaz (2008) also showed that countries
which introduce more regulations on employment conditions,
labour administration and training achieve higher levels of in-
dustrial productivity. They also found that countries with low
levels of inter-industry wage differentials are more successful in
reallocating their resources and raising productivity.
Arulampalam and Booth (1998) deeply investigated the rela-
tionship between fixed-term contracts and training, part-time
versus full-time work, and the complementarities between ed-
ucation and training. According to the human capital pre-
dictions, they found in five European countries a significantly
lower probability for men with temporary contracts to receive
training. On the contrary, they did not observe any signif-
icant differences on training between part-time and full-time
workers.
Laursen and Foss (2003), using data on 1900 Danish firms,
tested the hypothesis that human resource management in-
fluences positively the firm innovation performance3. They
concluded that change in the organisation of the employment
relationship (team-based organisation, decentralisation of deci-
sion rights, internal knowledge dissemination, quality circles...)
does matter for a firm to be innovative. They claimed that
workforce training and increased knowledge spreading, for ex-
ample through job rotation, may be expected to be a force
3“[..] The term knowledge management is used to refer to the practices - implicit or
explicit - used by a firm to acquire new knowledge and to rearrange and spread existing
knowledge within the firm. It also includes strategies that are independent either to
prevent the firm’s own knowledge from ‘leaking’ out or to encourage the dissemination
of its knowledge to partner firms and others from whom the firm might benefit in mutual
knowledge exchange.[..]". (Hall and Mairesse (2006)).
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pulling in the direction of a higher rate of improvement process
and innovations. In particular, they stressed the importance of
organisational requirements for coordinating the complemen-
tarities between different technologies for reaping the benefit
they may produce.
Finally, in a framework similar to ours, Kleinknecht et al.
(2006) show that external flexible labour led in Netherlands,
during the 1980s and 1990s, to savings on firm wage bills, lead-
ing to the Dutch job miracle. However, they also showed that
this coincided with a decline of labour productivity - firms that
have a high turnover or high shares of temporary workers do not
achieve significant increases in sales growth. In addition, their
analysis illustrates that firms that relied on internal flexibility
were able, in spite of higher wages, to increase their produc-
tivity significantly. This effect is particularly remarkable for
firms that are engaged in R&D activities. In the authors’ view
these results confirm the hypothesis that functional flexibility
is more beneficial to innovators because it makes them more
willing to invest in trust and loyalty of their personnel, which
- in turn - is crucial for the accumulation of (tacit) knowledge.
2.4 The Italian Labour Market
During the 1990s Italy gradually introduced new arrangements
in the labour law system. In 1997, in particular, the law
known as Pacchetto Treu (named after the then Labour Min-
ister) expanded the range of admissible fixed-term contracts
and started a phasing out of the monopoly of the Public Em-
ployment Service by opening the market to private job place-
ment agencies. It also extended the spreading of part-time em-
ployment, fixed-term training and apprenticeship contracts for
young workers4. In 2000, the Legislative Decree 61 - transpos-
4The search for increased flexibility has also been directed toward a range of labour
and product market institutions, to the wage setting process, as well as administrative
8
ing the EU Directive on working time (93/104) - represented
another important step towards more flexible work relations
and the spreading of part-time contracts. It introduced elastic
clauses (‘clausole elastiche’), particularly significant for organ-
ising part-time work shifts on a flexible basis, as well as ex-
tra hours (‘lavoro supplementare’), allowing employees to work
longer than originally agreed5.
As some authors suggested (Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Dav-
eri (2004)), such reforms were asymmetric and introduced a
two-tier system - since the use of fixed-term contracts kept the
legislation applied to the stock of workers largely untouched -
and changed regulations only for a subset of workers. Subse-
quently, Italy, as well as other European countries which intro-
duced two-tier systems6, experienced - thanks to the significant
contribution of fixed-term contracts - a protracted employment
growth despite moderate output growth, which means a decline
in labour productivity growth.7 These results could be the neg-
ative effects of fixed-term contracts on labour productivity, as
these flexible arrangements induced a change in the workforce
composition, the entry of low-skilled workers and/or workers
with low schooling levels.
We agree and we argue, as Kleinknecht et al. (2006) argued for
the Netherlands, that this could be a reasonable explanation for
Italy, too, since flexibility strongly affects the firms’ innovative
capacity and hence one of the key factors that enable firms to
survive and grow.
rules (industrial action procedures, internal union organization and financing, adminis-
trative simplification)
5For a detailed description of this reforms see Emanuele et al. (2001). In 2003, further
changes were introduced by the legislative decree 276 (the so-called Legge Biagi). It
changed the elastic clauses, by introducing new flexible clauses, and the calculation
criteria and inserted supplementary work (Rustichelli (2005)). However, this reform
took place at the end of our sample, so we can neglect it in this analysis.
6Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Portugal. See Boeri and
Garibaldi (2007).
7For an investigation of the effects of employment protection on firm productivity
in the US see Autor et al. (2007).
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2.5 Data description
The data used in this work are obtained by the two most re-
cent waves - the 8th and the 9th - of the comprehensive sur-
vey on Italian manufacturing firms carried out by Capitalia
(and previously by Mediocredito Centrale) every three years.
These surveys are conducted through questionnaires, adminis-
tered to a representative sample of manufacturing firms within
the national borders. Questionnaires collected information over
the previous three years (1998-2000 and 2001-2003) and, for
the majority of firms, are supplemented with standard balance
sheet data. 8. The sample is stratified with references to the
number of employees, goods/services sector and geographical
area. Throughout the analysis we will rely on sampling weights
to extend results to the overall population of Italian manufac-
turing firms and to avoid inaccurate estimates and standard
errors. The 8th and the 9th survey include respectively 4,289
and 4,497 firms. To broaden the sample period of our analy-
sis, we merged these two waves and obtained a reduced sample
of 2,097 firms. This sample includes only those firms existing
in both surveys and, hence, with potentially complete obser-
vations over the 1998-2003 period. We further excluded firms
with incomplete information.
We will progressively use the data panel structure in order to
check and address the endogeneity problems.
Based on this sample, tables (1) and (2) report the population
percentages (and standard errors) of firms with either product
or process innovation. The most important information is the
8The principal information contained in the questionnaire concerns: general news on
the company, its ownership, controlling interests, and membership of groups, workforce,
investment activities, technological innovation, research and development, internation-
alisation, commercial and competitive channels, finance. See Survey of manufacturing
enterprises http://www.unicredit-capitalia.eu/DOC/jsp/navigationDayOne/
include_content.jsp?parCurrentId=0b0030398053d889&parCurrentPage=indagini_
manifatturiere.html&parLocale=en
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increasing percentage of innovative firms, across size and sec-
tors, over the period considered (the only exception is the %
of firms with more than 500 employees making process inno-
vation). These higher percentages reflect the higher number
of firms carrying out R&D. As table (3) shows, particularly in
high-tech industries, the majority of firms are involved in R&D
activities. This is even more visible for larger firms where this
percentage reached 92% in high-tech sectors9.
2.6 The empirical model and results
External flexible workers earn lower wages whereas internal
flexible workers, in general, do not. Do such cost savings affect
the firms’ innovative capacity? If so, in which way? In princi-
ple, lower wage bills are a competitive advantage. However, we
also expect firms that employ more tenured workers and have a
greater degree of internal flexibility to show higher productiv-
ity gains and better innovative capacity. On the contrary, firms
that have a higher degree of external flexibility may incur in
losses in terms of social and human capital. Therefore, we ex-
pect the consequences of greater external flexibility to depend
strongly on firms’ characteristics. The relevance of a possibly
negative impact of flexibility on human and social capital may
be worse for knowledge-intensive firms10.
We adopt a generalized (Type 2) Tobit model consisting of two
equations, where the first one is a probit equation determin-
ing whether a firm innovates or not (“propensity to innovate”),
9Firms where classified as in:
- low-tech sectors: textile, wood, food, plastic, paper, coke, non metallic and nec
(not elsewhere classified).
- high-tech sectors: vehicles, machinery and chemicals
10We have no data on internal functional flexibility and therefore we can only inves-
tigate the consequences of quantitative internal flexibility and external flexibility.
11
and the second one is a linear regression (the Tobit equation
or “intensity to innovate”) explaining how much the firm inno-
vates (Mohnen et al. (2006)). We will measure firms’ innova-
tive propensity by means of new processes and new products
introduced into the market whereas firm innovation intensity
can be measured by the share of innovative sales in total sales.
Contrary to other types of surveys (i.e. Community Innova-
tion Survey - CIS), it is not possible to distinguish between
innovative sales corresponding to products new for the firm
but possibly known to the market, which can be considered
imitations of products already produced by other competitors,
and those corresponding to products only new for the market,
which can be regarded as true innovations.
Denoting by y1i the binary variable indicating if firm i is an
innovative firm - that is, a dummy variable indicating whether
the firm has introduced at least one product or process inno-
vation - we can write
y1i =
{
= 1 if y∗1i > 0
= 0 if y∗1i ≤ 0 (2.1)
where y∗1i = x1ib1 + u1i is a latent variable that represents the
incentives to innovate. x1i is a vector of explanatory variables,
b1 is a vector of parameter to be estimated, and u1i is a random
error term, which includes the effect of left-out omitted vari-
ables. As explanatory variables x1i, in addition to the amount
of resources spent on R&D per employee (IE) and fixed capital
per employee (INV EST ), we use industry and area dummies,
firm size and age (LOGSIZE and AGE), and group mem-
bership (GROUP ). Industry dummies capture technological
opportunity conditions, industry-targeted innovation policies,
and industry-specific labour market features as well as differen-
tial demand growth effects. Size reflects access to finance, scale
economies and differences in the work organization (Mohnen
et al. (2006)). In order to account for the fact that young
12
firms grow faster, we also add a dummy for firms that are less
than three years old (Y OUNG). It is valuable to include a
dummy also for firms that underwent structural change during
the period of the analysis (M&As) and for firms operating on
international markets (INTERNATIONAL COMP ).
As the main objective of our investigation is to control how
labour market regulations affects firms’ innovativeness, we es-
timate the probability to be innovative controlling for different
labour arrangements including in the explanatory set, x1i, vari-
ables representing
• the internal flexibility: the percentage of temporary and
permanent part-time workers (pt_temp and pt_perm),
the percentage of workers who received training (training);
• the external flexibility: the percentage of full-time tem-
porary workers (ft_temp), the percentage of workers with
flexible contracts (co.co.co), the percentage of workers com-
ing from manpower agencies (man_power), and the labour
turnover (turnover).
The second equation of the Tobit (type 2) model is specified
in terms of a second latent variable y∗2i which is equal to the
actual share of innovative sales y2i, if the firm is innovative (i.e,
y∗1i > 0). Since the share of innovative sales is bounded by 0
and 1, it is preferable to perform a logit transformation of the
data and express this second equation in terms of the latent
logit-share variable z∗2i = ln(y∗2i/(1 − y∗2i)) which varies from
−∞ to +∞. Thus we can write our second equation as
z2i =
{
= z∗2i if y∗1i > 0
= undefined if y∗1i ≤ 0 (2.2)
or equivalently
y2i =
{
= ez∗2i/(1 + ez∗2i) if y∗1i > 0
= 0 if y∗1i ≤ 0
(2.3)
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where z∗2i = x2ib2 + u2i.
x2 is a vector of explanatory variables, b2 is a vector of param-
eters to be estimated and u2i > 0 is an error term reflecting
omitted variables. Since we have data on sale growth for the
majority of the firms in the panel (98%), we decide to exploit
the data panel structure in order to exclude the variable past
sales growth (g_sales[t − 1]) from the explanatory variables
we have in x2i, and to include it in x1i. This variable, in fact,
can be a decisive factor of innovation, as reflecting stronger
demand and easier internal and external access to finance. As
many firms do not indicate the percentage of workers for dif-
ferent work arrangements, there are many missing values in
the variables of our interest making our final sample of 1108
observations for the period 2001-2003.
Nevertheless, interesting results have emerged. In general,
labour arrangements do matter when explaining firms’ innova-
tion capacity. In particular, the percentage of part-time work-
ers and firm labour turnover appeared the most relevant in
different specifications of the model.
Assuming that u1 and u2 are bivariate normal with zero mean,
and σu1 = 1 , we can estimate the model as a generalized Tobit
(type 2) model using STATA Heckman procedure for survey
analysis. Preliminary results for the model without consid-
ering any labour variables are reported in table (4). Those
preliminary results suggest the plausibility of the model, as it
is indicated by the significance level of the selection variable
g_salest−1, and problems of selection, as the ρ coefficient in-
dicates. Results for the traditional regressors are in line with
literature. Larger firms and firms facing international com-
petition are more likely to introduce innovation. Firms with
higher spending on R&D and fixed investment are also more
likely to be innovative and have a higher percentage of sales
stemming from innovative products. International agreements
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also positively affects firms’ ability to innovate.
In tables (5) results for the model controlling labour variables
are reported, also in interactions with a dummy variables for
high-tech. We observe that part-time workers positively affect
the probability to innovate at 1% level. For high-tech firms, at
1% level, it also affects the percentage of new products in total
sales. Though it could be more expensive to employ part-time
workers, they might be involved in training activities so as to
acquire and improve skills. For high-tech firms, at 1% level, a
higher labour turnover has a negative impact on the probability
to innovate, as well as on firms’ intensity of innovation. This is
probably because a higher turnover makes it difficult to develop
long-term and trust-based relations. This, in turn, could mean
firms’ inability to take advantage of innovations or to promote
innovation, not investing enough on those able to carry out
R&D.
Results for low-tech firms are less clear. At 5% level, labour
variables are all jointly significant. In particular, part-time
variables turned to positively affect at 5% level firms’ propen-
sity to innovate, whereas variables accounting for external flex-
ibility are not significant in the intensity to innovate equation.
2.6.1 Innovations and Work Arrangements
Relying on the same set of (time-varying) variables used in the
previous section, and by completely exploiting the data panel
structure, in this section we will estimate probability models for
the introduction of a product or a process innovation so as to
investigate the effects of different labour arrangements while
controlling for endogeneity issues11. Given the fact that we
11As in this previous section, we calculated the mean of the labour variables - where
available - over three/two years. Whereas we did not observe any response for three
years in the 1998-2000 period, we assumed a value of zero. Since the assumption seems
reasonable according to the questionnaire structure, this has been done in order to
obtain a proper sample size.
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only have two observations about the introduction of innova-
tion, it is not possible to fully address the endogeneity problems
and to identify causal links. However, since one fundamental
problem is to control unobserved corporate characteristics that
are constant over time, the conditional logit model will work
properly. Conditional logit models eliminate the firm specific
effects, but only switchers (that is, firms that introduced an
innovation in just one of the two sub-periods) contribute to
the likelihood function. Therefore, we can rely on a restricted
number of observations. Indeed, we cannot master another
potential source of endogeneity caused by technological shock
that leads, for example, to an increase both in the probability
of observing an innovation and in the research intensity (Parisi
et al. (2006)).
Table (6) reports results for the conditional model, where in
column (2) we re-estimate the model of column (1), but using
a dummy variable for R&D, in IE’s stead, the variable mea-
suring the amount of resource spent in R&D per employee, as
there were firms reported to R&D, but were not able to indicate
how much they spent for this purpose. Likewise, INV E is a
dummy variable equal to 1 that replaces INV EST for firm de-
clared to have invested in fixed capital but did not indicate the
amount. On the whole, results are substantially similar. For
high-tech firms, variables representing external flexibility have
a negative effect in explaining the probability of introducing
process or product innovations. In particular, the percentage
of workers coming from manpower agencies is negative and sig-
nificant at 10%. The variable accounting for internal flexibility
(the percentage of part-time workers) again are positive and
significant for both group of firms, but for high-tech firms this
effect is significantly higher.
These regressions confirm the importance of work arrange-
ments in affecting firms’ innovative capacity and reinforce pre-
vious results. In particular, the variables representing internal
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flexibility have again positive effects on firms’ ability to inno-
vate for both high-tech and low-tech firms. Concerning ex-
ternal flexibility, especially for high-tech firms some variables
turned out to be negative and significant, suggesting that they
may have negative effects on firms’ ability to innovate.
2.6.2 A panel data selection estimator
In recent years a number of panel estimators have been sug-
gested for sample selection model, where both the selection
equation and the equation of interest contain individual effects
which are correlated with explanatory variables (Dustmann
and Rochina-Barrachina (2007), Raymond et al. (2007)). Re-
lying on this literature, in this paragraph we fully exploit the
panel structure of our dataset by estimating a selection model
where both the selection and regression equation may contain
firm effects correlated to unobservables. In particular, we uti-
lize the two step estimator proposed by Rochina-Barrachina
(1999) which extend Heckman’s sample selection technique de-
veloped in the first part of section 6 to the case where one cor-
related selection rule in two different time periods generated
the sample.
The idea of this estimator is to eliminate the individual effects
from the equation of interest by taking time differences, and
then condition upon the outcome of the selection process be-
ing “one” (observed) in the two periods (Rochina-Barrachina
(1999)). In the first step, two correction terms have to be esti-
mated, the form of which depends upon the assumption made
about the selection process and the joint distribution of unob-
servables. By noting that for a firm which is innovative in two
periods, and therefore has been selected into the second stage
estimation, first differencing eliminates firms’ effect from equa-
tion (2.3), and with consistent estimates of the two correction
terms, simple least squares can be used to obtain consistent
17
estimates in the second step.
More precisely, the estimated equation is now given by,
zi2 − zi1 = xi2 − xi1 + l12λ1(.) + l21λ2(.) + vi21
∆zi21 = ∆xi21 + l12λ1(.) + l21λ2(.) + vi21 (2.4)
where the subscript now indicates time 1 and 2, and λ1 and λ2
are the correction terms.
To construct estimates of the λ terms a bivariate probit of
equation (2.1) is estimated in the first step for the two waves.
Then, only for the subsample with y2 = y1 = 1, we carry out a
regression of ∆z on ∆x, and λˆ to estimate the parameters of in-
terest. Results for the bivariate probit (not reported) indicate
a positive and significant coefficient of correlation between the
two equations. Tables (7) and (8) report results for the second
stage for low-tech and high-tech firms, respectively. As a test
for the joint significance of lambdas do not reject the null hy-
pothesis of joint significance, for both high-tech and low tech
firms, second stage standard errors must be corrected. Though
this estimator reduces the number of available observations in
the second step, these regressions are useful to make compar-
isons with the cross-sections analysis conducted in section 5
12. The most striking result, for firms in high-tech sectors, is
the highly significance level of the percentage of workers who
received training. A positive variation in the number of work-
ers who received training is associated with a positive variation
in the share of sales stemming from innovative products. For
both high-tech and low-tech firms, the variable accounting for
labour turnover has at 10% level a negative effects. In ad-
dition, for low-tech firms the percentage of part-time workers
12In any case, even in small sample, this estimator is less biased than estimator ignor-
ing correction for sample selection. Monte Carlo analysis also showed that is estimator
is 1. robust to violation of conditional exchangeability (that is, sample selection varying
over time), 2. free from misspecification affecting the individual effects in both equa-
tions, 3.robust to correlation amongs variables over time, 4. and robust to violation of
the normality assumption (Rochina-Barrachina (1999)).
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and full-time temporary workers now turned to be positive and
significant with opposite sign. These results combined suggest
the presence of threshold, beyond which a high level of workers
entering and leaving the firm have a counter positive effects on
firms’ability to innovate.
2.7 Conclusions
In modern economies firms’ innovation and workers’ knowledge
are inextricably linked. Employees’ skills and knowledge are a
crucial asset of innovative firms: tacit organizational compe-
tence improves productivity and performance by selecting and
allocating competent people whereas lack of skills and training
can act as a constraint.
A firm which fails to develop skills risks to be unable to have
a good implementation of new technologies and spread innova-
tion in the whole firm, preventing workers from understanding
and producing innovative products and processes. Training
leads instead to an increase in the labour quality by equipping
employees with greater skills and knowledge. This makes the
practices - implicit or explicit - used by firms to acquire new
knowledge, and the re-arrangement and dissemination of exist-
ing knowledge within the firm (human management practices),
an important strategic resource as well.
The aim of this study was to test in which way flexible labour
arrangements influence - by affecting the long-term relationship
between firms and workers - firms’ ability to innovate. Since
there could be valuable differences, both in terms of costs and
workers’ attitude towards firms, we distinguish two different
kinds of flexibility: internal and external. Internal flexibility
does not necessarily yield wage cost saving and, on the contrary,
could even lead to a significant increase. From this perspec-
tive, part-time work can be used to accommodate working hour
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preferences and enhance loyalty, as well as for training or edu-
cational breaks. External flexibility aims instead at the labour
quantitative adaptation to firms’ requirements by easily hiring
or dismissing, as well as by means of temporary contracts lead-
ing to higher staff turnover and to (possibly) low-trust labour
relations.
In particular, we believe that the new labour arrangements,
introduced in the nineties in the Italian system of labour law,
might have influenced the Italian firms’ ability to innovate sim-
ply inducing a change in the workforce composition.
Our econometric analysis seems to support this view. Results
on internal flexibility indicate that higher percentages of part-
time workers are associated with a better ability to innovate.
This effect is stronger for firms in high-tech sectors. For high-
tech firms, the percentage of workers who received training
turned out to be particularly relevant. On the other hand,
results on external flexibility are rather mixed. Especially for
both high-tech and low-tech firms, a higher turnover negatively
affects the percentage of new products in total sales. However,
for low-tech firms, there are some labour arrangements that
positively affect the degree of firms’ innovativeness. A plausible
explanation for these results is that an excessive use of flexible
arrangement may be negative for firms’ ability to innovate. In
line with the European Directive 1999/70/EC, according to
which ‘permanent contracts must be the standard form across
member States’, the use of fixed-term contracts must be limited
- due to technical, productive and organizational reasons - to
extraordinary periods of firm activity.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on internal quali-
tative flexibility which would really capture the adaptation of
labour to the changing needs of the firm. All these results com-
bined, however, suggest that there is an optimum of flexibility,
beyond which firms’ labour flexibility can negatively affect the
20
ability of a firm to innovate and, hence, to survive and develop.
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APPENDIX I In this section the variables used in the re-
gressions are described. They are obtained from the 8th and
9th survey on Italian manufacturing firms carried out by Cap-
italia every three years.
INNOVATION: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the enterprise reports to have introduced new production pro-
cesses or products during 2001
IE:Average total expenditure for internal and external R&D
divided per employees over the period 2001-2003/1998-2000.
R&D: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm re-
ports to have carried out R&D during the period 2001-2003/1998-
2000.
INVEST: Average gross investments in innovative tangible
goods per employees over the period 2001-2003/1998-2000.
INVE: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm
reports to have invested in innovative tangible goods during
the period 2001-2003/1998-2000.
YOUNG: dummy equal to 1 if the firms is less then three
years old
M&As: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm’s
was involved in merger and acquisition dealings.
INTERNATIONAL_COMP: dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the enterprise’s most significant market is inter-
national (outside E.U.).
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS: dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the enterprise has developed techni-
cal agreements with firms operating on international markets
(outside E.U.).
PATENTS_BOUGHT: dummy which takes the value 1 if
the firms bought patents during the period 2001-2003/1998-
2000.
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PATENTS_SOLD: dummy which takes the value 1 if the
firms sold patents during the period 2001-2003/1998-2000.
LOGSIZE: average number of employees during the period
2001-2003/1998-2000.
g_sales[t-1]: the turnover growth rate calculated using vari-
ables as collected during the period 1998-2000
pt_indeter: the percentage of permanent part-time workers
pt_temp: the percentage of temporary part-time workers
training: the percentage of workers who received training
ft_temp: the percentage of full-time temporary workers
co.co.co: the percentage of workers with flexible contracts
man_power: the percentage of workers coming from man-
power agencies
turnover: labour turnover
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Table 1: % of firms with a product innovation
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.160 (0.014) 0.253 (0.027) 0.268 (0.017) 0.454 (0.034)
21-50 0.220 (0.015) 0.323 (0.032) 0.355 (0.016) 0.501 (0.027)
51-250 0.281 (0.030) 0.346 (0.039) 0.415 (0.015) 0.569 (0.022)
251-500 0.355 (0.064) 0.613 (0.076) 0.421 (0.046) 0.702 (0.050)
>500 0.598 (0.102) 0.671 (0.090) 0.391 (0.042) 0.426 (0.045)
() standard errors
Table 2: % of firms with a process innovation
FIRM SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.287 (0.017) 0.321 (0.029) 0.287 (0.017) 0.297 (0.031)
21-50 0.364 (0.018) 0.397 (0.033) 0.371 (0.016) 0.417 (0.026)
51-250 0.490 (0.034) 0.497 (0.041) 0.494 (0.015) 0.508 (0.023)
251-500 0.460 (0.066) 0.660 (0.074) 0.498 (0.047) 0.614 (0.053)
>500 0.534 (0.102) 0.549 (0.099) 0.494 (0.043) 0.379 (0.044)
() standard errors
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Table 3: % of firms doing R&D
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.216 (0.016) 0.372 (0.030) 0.220 (0.016) 0.462 (0.034)
21-50 0.317 (0.017) 0.529 (0.034) 0.347 (0.016) 0.590 (0.026)
51-250 0.452 (0.034) 0.720 (0.037) 0.480(0.015) 0.704 (0.020)
251-500 0.632 (0.066) 0.879 (0.051) 0.561 (0.047) 0.783 (0.049)
>500 0.835 (0.079) 0.873 (0.069) 0.791 (0.044) 0.923 (0.031)
() standard errors
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Table 5: Estimation results: HECKMAN ADDING LABOUR VARI-
ABLES
In the propensity equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable which
takes value 1 if the firm has introduced at least one product or process innovation
whereas in the intensity equation the dependent variable is a logit transformation
of the actual share of innovative sales. The exclusionary variable is g_sales[t−1]
Intensity Propensity
Eq(1) Eq(2)
IE 0.2124*** (0.026) 0.1812*** (0.035)
INVEST 0.0040 (0.010) 0.0199*** (0.007)
AGE 0.0001 (0.007) -0.0021 (0.003)
YOUNG 0.1125 (1.832) -0.7406 (0.481)
M&As 0.5702* (0.302) 0.0443 (0.147)
INTERN._COMP 0.1451 (0.213) 0.2394** (0.118)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.0040 (0.509) 0.2328 (0.294)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.2401 (0.909) -0.5260 (0.440)
INTERN._AGREEM. 0.3474 (0.339) 0.4901** (0.200)
pt_perm 0.8922 (1.349) 0.3384 (0.630)
pt_temp 0.5901 (1.876) 3.6953*** (1.245)
ft_temp 1.3572 (1.063) 0.3562 (0.450)
manpower -0.6831 (1.181) 0.4125 (0.548)
cococo -1.9631 (1.536) -1.0022 (0.813)
training 1.8883 (1.248) 0.4350 (0.510)
turnover 0.0934 (0.095) 0.1137** (0.057)
LOGSIZE -0.0003 (0.000) 0.0023*** (0.001)
pt_permxHT -3.7490 (4.266) -1.5491 (1.932)
pt_tempxHT 25.0935*** (9.646) 3.2444 (4.734)
ft_tempxHT 1.4042 (1.447) 0.7312 (0.894)
manpowerxHT 1.4405 (1.719) 0.3940 (0.922)
cococoxHT 4.8549 (3.604) 2.0756 (1.641)
trainingxHT -0.9841 (1.515) 0.1795 (0.819)
turnoverxHT -2.3675* (1.320) -1.1653* (0.631)
HIGH_TECH 2.0145** (0.987) 0.2215 (0.385)
g_salest−1 0.3014 (0.090)
Constant -4.5710*** (0.769) -0.6148** (0.245)
σ 1.5792*** (0.187)
ρ 0.7975*** (0.078)
ll -30655.559
N 559 1108
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Note: Regressions include sector and area dummies
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Table 6: Estimation results: CONDITIONAL LOGIT
In this model only switchers - that is, firms that introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods - contribute to the likelihood function. It controls
for unobserved firm characteristics that are constant over time. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods.
(1) (2)
IE 0.3365*** (0.103)
INVEST -0.0009 (0.001)
RS 1.1925*** (0.259)
INVE 1.3196*** (0.391)
PATENTS_SOLD -0.0665 (0.881) 0.7125 (0.964)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 1.3807 (0.977) 1.2529* (0.753)
INTERN._AGREEMENTS 1.3597* (0.744) 1.6121** (0.760)
M&As 1.0219** (0.424) 0.5774 (0.406)
LOGSIZE 0.0041 (0.005) -0.0008 (0.004)
INTERN._COMP -0.0164 (0.475) -0.2480 (0.370)
AGE 0.5047*** (0.158) 0.6975*** (0.157)
training -0.4623 (1.110) 0.4426 (1.163)
pt_temp 0.2059*** (0.060) 0.2111** (0.087)
ft_temp -0.3520 (1.010) -0.9775 (0.879)
pt_perm -2.6472 (2.698) -1.5134 (1.649)
turnover 0.1668 (0.216) 0.7183 (0.742)
manpower 2.0882 (1.939) 3.9480* (2.355)
cococo 2.6006* (1.481) 2.4861 (1.533)
pt_tempxHT 74.5371* (38.552) 53.2215 (40.013)
pt_permxHT 3.5723 (2.794) 1.7466 (1.797)
ft_tempxHT 2.8423 (4.621) 7.6202 (5.703)
turnoverxHT 1.4337 (1.574) 0.8210 (1.315)
cococoxHT -0.0454 (1.939) -0.0215 (1.866)
trainingxHT 0.4223 (1.718) 0.1540 (1.765)
manpowerxHT -2.4205 (3.134) -6.6649* (3.796)
ll -3662.53 -4577.97
N 654 822
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 7: Heckman panel estimator for low-tech firms (Rochina
1999) Two-stage panel estimation. The first step (not reported), is a bivariate
probit using all the observation to estimate λ1 and λ2. In the second step, for the
subsample of firms that innovate in both period, that is with d1 = 1 and d2 = 1,
I do least squares of ∆y on ∆x,λ1 and λ2.
∆ IE -0.0347 (0.066)
∆ INVESTST 0.0241 (0.015)
∆ LOGSIZE 0.0057** (0.003)
∆ PATENTS_BOUGHT -1.4031 (2.905)
∆ PATENTS_SOLD 0.0000 .
∆ INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS -0.2212 (0.501)
∆ M&As -0.7886* (0.417)
∆ INTERNATIONAL_COMP -0.4553 (0.334)
∆ AGE -1.8770** (0.759)
∆ pt_temp -34.9962 (43.973)
∆ pt_perm 1.2238*** (0.297)
∆ ft_temp 2.0345** (0.965)
∆ turnover -0.1368* (0.074)
∆ occasional 0.7207 (1.329)
∆ manpower 0.2598 (2.134)
∆ training -0.2293 (1.003)
lambda1 1.1147 (1.157)
lambda2 0.8668 (1.085)
N 102
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
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Table 8: Heckman panel estimator for high-tech firms (Rochina
1999) Two-stage panel estimation. The first step (not reported), is a bivariate
probit using all the observation to estimate λ1 and λ2. In the second step, for the
subsample of firms that innovate in both period, that is with d1 = 1 and d2 = 1,
I do least squares of ∆y on ∆x,λ1 and λ2.
∆ IE -0.0232 (0.027)
∆ INVESTST -0.0530* (0.027)
∆ LOGSIZE -0.0061* (0.003)
∆ PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.4391 (0.642)
∆ PATENTS_SOLD -0.4083 (1.080)
∆ INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS -0.1678 (0.493)
∆ M&As -0.4580 (0.366)
∆ INTERNATIONAL_COMP -0.2992 (0.484)
∆ AGE -1.4778** (0.647)
∆ pt_temp 2.2529 (4.256)
∆ pt_perm -1.1273 (3.030)
∆ ft_temp 1.2220 (1.027)
∆ turnover -0.6787 (1.456)
∆ occasional 0.5982 (1.621)
∆ manpower -0.7968 (1.747)
∆ training 1.3468** (0.554)
lambda1 1.8720 (1.523)
lambda2 -0.7364 (1.170)
N 107
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
35
Chapter 3
Flexicurity pathways
for Italy: learning
from Denmark?
Abstract
The aim of this work is identify the advantages and risks of
adopting flexicurity policies in Italy. In the first part, this pa-
per analyzes flexicurity in Denmark, one of the leading country
in this field. Even though it is not possible to directly trans-
pose policies from Denmark to Italy, important insights were
provided by such an analysis. In the second part, this work fo-
cuses on the Italian labour market only. In particular, on the
basis of an experimental analysis, it investigates the possibility
for Italy to adopt the first European flexicurity pathway which
suggests to rely on contractual arrangements so as to gradually
progress into better working conditions to address labour mar-
ket segmentation. In this experiment the unemployment level
is determined endogenously and the level of efforts made is ob-
servable by firms with a certain degree of uncertainty. Results
1
suggest that - especially in countries such as Italy, where there
is a limited scope for increasing spending - these contractual
arrangements can improve labour market efficiency by reducing
the unemployment level and increasing workers’ performance.
3.1 Introduction
The flexicurity model looks increasingly attractive to policy-
makers in Europe. The European Employment Strategy (EES)
calls for labour market institutions to adopt ‘flexicurity’ princi-
ples. Specifically, guideline No. 21 of the Integrated Guideline
for Growth and Employment for the period 2005-2008 calls on
Member States to “...promote flexibility combined with employ-
ment security and reduce labour market segmentation”. Like-
wise, the Annual Progress Report adopted by the Commission
in the re-launched Lisbon strategy also calls Member States
to “ ...seek convergence of views on the balance between flex-
ibility and employment security (i.e. flexicurity)”. The Joint
Employment Report 2006/2007 reiterates the main priorities
of the EES by emphasising once again the need for more strin-
gent reforms in order to strike a better balance between flex-
ibility and security in the labour market. In December 2007,
following the Communication of the European Commission on
’Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity’, the Council of
the European Union endorsed the final and consensual ver-
sion of the common principles of flexicurity. However, the EU
is also aware that different countries face different challenges
and that therefore there is not a single way, but rather several
pathways, towards flexibility. The various ways to improve na-
tional labour markets are linked to historical choices, as well as
to economic and social institutions. Although common prin-
ciples can drive reforms, different modalities of flexicurity and
combination with security can be followed. Thus flexicurity
can (and should) take different forms from country to country.
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After presenting a preliminary overview of the balance between
flexibility and security, the aim of this work is analyse the Ital-
ian labour market and find out which are the advantages and
risks of adopting flexicurity policies in this country. In order
to do so, the first part of the paper briefly outlines flexicu-
rity in Denmark, one of the leading country in this field, with
particularly favourable labour market outcomes and a long-
standing tradition of successfully implementation of flexicurity
principles. Even though it is not possible to strictly compare
their labour markets and directly transpose policies from Den-
mark to Italy, important insights can be gained in making
such a comparison. In particular, the focus will be on insti-
tutional/policy differences between these two countries. The
second part of this work focuses on the Italian labour market
to investigate, by means of an experimental analysis, the adop-
tion of the first European flexicurity pathway. This pathway
suggests - for countries like Italy with a segmented labour mar-
ket - to rely on contractual arrangements so as to progress into
better working condition in order to improve labour market ef-
ficiency and address labour market segmentation. The experi-
ment was conducted for two labour market environments: one
in which firms were allowed to submit offers to workers with-
out any restrictions, and one with protections, as firms might
be obliged to submit offers to workers in accordance to work-
ers’ ‘right to receive an offer’, as determined by the number
of periods they were hired by the same firms. In particular,
in this experimental analysis, the unemployment level is de-
termined endogenously by firms’ employment policies and the
workers’ level of efforts is observable with a certain degree of
uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces
the flexicurity framework and section 3 briefly outlines its main
strength in terms of labour market outcomes, as well as differ-
ent modalities to implement the flexicurity policies identified
3
by the European Commission. Section 4 describes the main
elements of the Danish model, by laying emphasis on the pos-
sibilities for policy transfer and learning for Italy. Once having
analysed the Danish labour market model, section 5 proceeds
to examine the Italian case and the current challenges that
its labour market model is facing today. Always looking at
these two countries, section 6 identifies the main difficulties
and advantages in implementing such policies in Italy. Finally,
section 7 presents the experimental analysis in order to test
in which way flexible contractual arrangements affect labour
market outcomes. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
3.2 The flexicurity framework
While the term flexicurity was first coined to describe a partic-
ular piece of legislation of labour regulation in the Netherlands,
the concept has nowadays increasingly been used to describe
the Danish labour market where liberal employment protec-
tions are combined with high social security, as well as active
labour market programs. From a previous situation marked
by high and persistent unemployment, Denmark is now close
to full employment. These favourable labour market outcomes
- often referred as ‘golden age’ or Danish ’job miracle’ - have
been attributed to the unique Danish combination of flexibility
and security.
The main idea of flexicurity is that flexibility and security -
rather than being contradictory - can be mutually support-
ive. This approach transcends the simple trade-off between
flexibility and security, where the former is seen to be in the
employer’s exclusive interest and the latter in the employee’s
interest. Flexicurity could be best seen as a system of joint and
mutual risk management for workers and employers (European
Expert Group (2007)). However, it must be recognized that
4
both flexibility and security are multidimensional concepts. In
order to compare national labour market systems, an under-
standing of the analytical framework of flexicurity is required
(Bredgaard and Larsen (2008)). In general terms, the possi-
bility of combining different levels of flexibility and security is
represented by means of the matrix (1)(Wilthagen and Tros
(2004)).
As this matrix highlights, flexicurity is a complex and multi-
dimensional concept which implies an analysis of different pol-
icy fields. Even though this matrix is a useful tool to iden-
tify relationships between flexibility and security, some impor-
tant aspects might be neglected in it. For example, there can
be contradictions between security arrangements provided by
firms and those provided by the State, or there might exist dif-
ferent forms of regulation (law, contract-based..) at different
levels (regionally, locally and individually). The most impor-
tant thing, as pointed out by Leschke et al. (2006), is to look at
this matrix by bearing in mind that flexibility and security are
not necessarily in a trade-off relationship, but can go hand in
hand in a mutually supportive or complementary relationship.
3.3 Why flexicurity?
While an increasing number of studies have been carried out
to discuss the concept of flexibility, widespread consensus is
lacking on how to measure flexicurity. Various indicators have
been proposed but none of them can incorporate all the various
aspect of flexicurity (i.e., see Philips (2007), Tangian (2005)).
As the flexicurity matrix highlights, flexicurity is a complex
concept that cannot be easily grasped by looking at one single
dimension. In spite of not having flexicurity synthetic indica-
tors, labour market outcome indicators have been identified to
illustrate the positive effects of flexicurity. The most important
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indicators of a successful balance are youth unemployment rate
(15-24 of age), long-term unemployment, poverty risk, growth
in labour productivity, total employment rate and women and
older workers’ employment rate. All these measures are avail-
able for downloading at the EUROSTAT website. Here, only
some of them are reported. As figure (1), (3) highlights, the
Danish road to fame has been supported by a number of im-
pressive statistics.
Figure 1: Low youth unemployment
The youth unemployment rate is low in a European perspec-
tive and shows a sharp downward trend. Even the long-term
unemployment rate fell sharply in the 1993-2003 period. These
figures however do not tell us that Denmark has almost a Eu-
ropean record in the percentage of employed people who every
year are affected by unemployment and receive unemployment
benefits (roughly 20%). Nevertheless, Danish workers have
a feeling of high job security among all workers’ subgroups.
A recent Eurobarometer reported that around 70% of Danes
favourably view the fact of changing their jobs every few years
(European Commission (2006)).
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Figure 2: low long term unemployment
3.3.1 European flexicurity pathways
Although the convergence of national policies can be observed
and common flexicurity principles have been identified (see Ap-
pendix 1), various modalities of flexicurity and combination
with security can (and should) emerge from country to coun-
try. Each and every Member State faces different challenges
and has different priorities. Therefore the Commission has de-
fined four components on the basis of which flexicurity policies
can be designed and implemented (European Expert Group
8
(2007), Bekker and Wilthagen (2008)):
• Pathway 1: dealing with flexibility at the mar-
gin. Within this pathway flexicurity aims at reducing
the asymmetries between standard and non-standard con-
tracts by promoting upward transitions on the labour
market and by integrating non-standard contracts fully
into labour law, collective agreements, social security and
lifelong learning systems. It is also possible to make stan-
dard contracts more attractive by adding progressively
adequate protections as the working relationship contin-
ues.
• Pathway 2: securing transition from job to job.
This pathway emphasizes the need to allow for quick ac-
cess to training funds and facilities, even at branch level,
in order to ensure progress into new jobs either within the
company or outside it.
• Pathway 3: access to learning. This pathway en-
hances the need to invest in skills and RD in order to
address both employers’ and employees’ flexibility needs.
In particular, labour market access must be kept for low-
skilled workers and other groups at risk, such as women,
early school leavers, older workers and minorities, so as to
prevent them from becoming long-term unemployed.
• Pathway 4: supporting transition to regular work.
Active labour market policies should prevent long-term
welfare dependence and should offer incentives (or threat
effect) and opportunities (or qualification effect) to re-
turn to work quickly (Madsen (2008)). This pathway also
stresses the need to increase the employment of people in
the informal sector.
Bekker and Wilthagen (2008) adds a fifth component as a gen-
eral precondition: the development of a supportive and pro-
ductive social dialogue.
9
Table 2: The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008
Rank Country Score
1 US 5.67
2 Switzerland 5.62
3 Denmark 5.55
4 Sweden 5.54
5 Germany 5.51
6 Finland 5.49
7 Singapore 5.45
8 Japan 5.43
9 UK 5.41
10 Netherlands 5.40
These pathways represent ideas that have been developed at
EU level1. As the literature on policy transfer and Europeani-
sation illustrates, the barriers to policy learning - either di-
rectly from the neighbours or from policies advocated by the
EU - are manifold: country vulnerability (i.e., the presence
or the absence of economics crisis), political institutional ca-
pacity, policy legacies and preferences, etc (Schmidt (2002)).
Therefore, each Member State must come up with tailor-made
policies which are best suited to its specific history, institu-
tions, starting position, political and cultural contexts. Simple
transfers - and the Danish experience is not an exception to
this rule - are rarely feasible. Nevertheless, as Madsen (2008)
said, and every teacher would agree, one real-life example tells
more than a torrent of abstractions! Therefore the positive in-
ternational attention on Denmark over recent years is justified.
A better understanding of Denmark’s best practices can act as
an important source of inspiration for change.
In fact, Denmark - along with Nordic countries - is a sort of
counterevidence to the common assumptions that high taxa-
1For a detailed discussion on European pathways, see European Expert Group
(2007).
10
tion is detrimental for competitiveness (in 2007 Denmark was
once again ranked at the top of the World Economic Com-
petitiveness Index, see table (2)) or that in European coun-
tries there is stronger preference for leisure (Blanchard (2007),
Alesina et al. (2005)). Figure (3) shows that the European
countries with high out-of-work maintenance and support are
also the countries where the participation rate (especially fe-
males’) is high. Obviously, this is not surprising considering
that it is a prerequisite for the model to be financially viable
to have high participation (and employment) rates.
Figure 3: Participation rate (total and female)
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Let us examine the Danish experience in greater detail.
3.4 The ‘Golden triangle’: the Dan-
ish case of flexicurity
The Danish labour market model - often described as the ‘golden
triangle’ - consists of three elements: the flexible dismissal
rules, the generous and long lasting unemployment benefits
and the active labour market policy (ALPM) (Bredgaard et al.
(2005)). Using Wilthagen’s matrix categorisation, the Danish
flexicurity model combines high external numerical flexibility
with a high level of income security and high level of employ-
ment security.
Denmark has very flexible hiring and firing rules. According
to the OECD Report on employment protection, Denmark is
one of the 25% of countries with fewest dismissal rules (OECD
2004). On average, about one quarter of all workers expe-
rience unemployment and job transitions at least once every
year (Bredgaard et al. (2005)). Recognition of the employ-
ers’ right to hire and fire at will dates back to the September
Compromise of 1899, when employers’ association and trade
union movement entered into an agreement for settling dis-
putes. Since the end of the 1980s, the only change to the Dan-
ish employment protection rules has been related to temporary
agency work regulations, which allow more employment cate-
gories to rely on fixed-term contracts. No significant changes
to employment protection were introduced in the 1990s.
While employment protection rules have remained almost the
same for a number of years, some reforms of the social security
system (such as unemployment benefits and social assistance
for the unemployed) took place in the 1990s.
The underlying principle of these changes was not reduce the
level of unemployment benefits but rather enforce the incen-
12
tives to seek and accept jobs. The eligibility period for unem-
ployment benefits has been reduced drastically. In 1993 un-
employed people were eligible for unemployment benefits for
7 years, and there was a right to requalification by partici-
pating in programmes during the activation period. Today,
as a result of these reforms, the eligibility period for unem-
ployment benefits has been reduced to 4 years and the right
to requalification for eligibility in activation programmes has
been abolished. The ‘right and duty’ principle has de facto
been introduced. This means that unemployed people are en-
titled to receive compensation for loss of income but they must
seek a job and take part in skills upgrading activities. The un-
employed have the right to income support as well as the duty
to activation after 12 months of unemployment. At the same
time, society has the right to require something from recipients
of income transfers, but also the duty to help them improving
their job prospects (Andersen and Svarer (2007)).
As in Finland and Sweden, the unemployment insurance model
is based on the Gent system - a voluntary scheme which is not
managed by the State, but by trade union-linked funds.
The Danish Gent system of voluntary unemployment insurance
is currently run by the 36 separate independent insurance funds
(a-kasser) de facto affiliated to trade unions (LO, FTF, AC).
All these funds are regulated by legislation, which defines com-
mon criteria for benefit eligibility and entitlement, as well as
job search requirements, suitability of job offers and job seekers’
readiness for employment. Except for two funds reserved for
self-employed people, the structure of unemployment insurance
reflects the Danish trade union structure, which differentiates
between blue and white collar employees, as well as the educa-
tional and vocational skills achieved. In 2002, after a legislative
change, further three funds began to use the newly-created op-
tion of recruiting members irrespective of their particular em-
ployment or educational background. Despite being actively
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engaged in advertising their services and reducing membership
fees, these competition-oriented funds cover only 17% of the to-
tal membership in Denmark (Clasen and Viebrock (2008)).Un-
employment insurance is funded by means of tax subsidies and
individual membership fees, which are less significant than the
tax subsidies stemming both from general taxation and a hy-
pothetical 8% labour market tax on gross earnings levied on
all active people.
On the other hand, the active labour market policy (ALMP) is
rather new and originated in the 1993-94 labour market reform.
ALPM laid emphasis on upgrading skills and job training in or-
der to increase the chances of the unemployed person to return
to employment. It could be argued (referring to the flexicu-
rity matrix) that there was a shift away from lifelong income
security to a higher degree of employment security. Besides
the employment security provided by an active labour market
policy, an important role is played by education policy, par-
ticularly continuing vocational training (CVT) policies. Since
1960, the CVT policies have provided services and training for
both the employed and the unemployed. Even if the social
partners plan and run the CVT system, the State is its main
purveyor of funds.
3.5 The Italian labour market
Time-series data on the EPL indicator (OECD 2004) shows a
declining trend in the stringency of dismissal regulations. In
Italy, as in most other cases such as Belgium, Greece, Germany,
Sweden, Portugal and Netherlands, the change has been mainly
driven by easing regulations on temporary employment, facil-
itating the recourse to fixed-term contracts and workers hired
from temporary workers’ agencies. In 1997, in particular, the
law known as Pacchetto Treu (named after the Labour Min-
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ister) extended the range of admissible fixed-term contracts
and started to gradually abolish the Public Employment Ser-
vice monopoly by opening the market to private job-placement
agencies. It also further spread part-time employment, and
fixed-term training and apprenticeship contracts for young new
workers. The search for increased flexibility has also been di-
rected towards a wide range of labour and product market in-
stitutions, the wage setting process, as well as administrative
rules (industrial action procedures, internal union organization
and financing, administrative streamlining and simplification).
Considering the political deadlock of loosening EPL for regu-
lar jobs, the expansion of temporary employment was a way to
circumvent the stringent rules on regular contracts, but it was
asymmetric and introduced a two-tier system, since the use of
fixed-term contracts left the legislation applied to the stock of
workers largely untouched. In 2000, Legislative Decree no. 61
- incorporating the EU working time Directive (93/104) - was
another important step towards more flexible work relation-
ship and the spreading of part-time contracts. It introduced
the so-called elastic clauses (’clausole elastiche’), particularly
significant for organising part-time work shifts on a flexible ba-
sis, as well as extra hours (’lavoro supplementare’), allowing
employees to work longer than originally agreed upon.
In 2003, further changes were introduced by Legislative Decree
no. 276 (the so-called Legge Biagi) which has changed elastic
clauses, by introducing new flexible clauses, and the criteria to
calculate and include supplementary work (Rustichelli (2005)).
As is well documented in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), loosening
EPL for fixed-term contracts - while maintaining stringent EPL
for regular jobs - created two diverging effects. On the one
hand, firms became more willing to hire new workers with fixed-
term contracts, thus increasing job creation. On the other
hand, by maintaining high firing costs for regular jobs the share
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of fixed-term contracts turned into regular jobs decreased, thus
leading to more job destruction. The main consequence was the
creation of a dual market and lower productivity and output.
As to unemployment benefits, Italy represents an anomaly on
the European scene, not only in terms of money spent in ac-
tive and passive labour market policies. In general terms, cur-
rent measures are not reactive to the economic downturn, ei-
ther because they start on a regular basis or are available to
long-term unemployed (Pirrone and Sestito (2006)). Moreover,
these measures are granted without any connection with acti-
vation measures or, in other words, there are rights without
any duties. This situation is even more acute if we consider
that these measures are not available to every workers who has
a working history and, moreover, those who have rights might
not be the weakest workers. Finally, there is another peculiar-
ity that makes the Italian system everything but an insurance
system: the regular practice to depart from rules by extend-
ing these interventions close to their expiry date (Pirrone and
Sestito (2006)).
3.6 Italy vs Denmark
The unemployment insurance system and employment protec-
tions are two alternative ways of protecting individuals against
labour market risk and the Italian and Danish labour markets,
as well as cross-country evidence, point to some degree of re-
placeability. However, the international competitive pressure
seems to tip the balance in favour of the unemployment insur-
ance protection system because it facilitates re-allocation and
mobility if appropriately supported by active labour market
policies.
Is it possible for Italy to make such a shift? Which will be
the risks and the costs involved in managing a system mainly
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based on unemployment insurance?
Firstly, this shift may prove to be very hard to put into prac-
tice due to political and economic constraints. As suggested
by Boeri et al. (2004, 2006), the combination of employment
protection and unemployment insurance may depend on the
population skill structure. Their analysis outlines a political
feasibility theorem according to which the employment protec-
tion reforms need to trade labour market flexibility with State
unemployment insurance which redistributes in favour of the
low-skill workforce segments. Furthermore, there exist also cul-
ture problems (Guiso et al. (2006)). Algan and Cahuc (2006)
argue that the continental and Mediterranean European coun-
tries are likely to be unable to implement the Danish model
because the lack of their citizens’ ‘public-spiritedness’ raises
moral hazard issues, which hinder the implementation of ef-
ficient public unemployment insurance. Therefore a country
may be likely to fail in its labour market reforms without a
comprehensive policy affecting its citizens’ civic behaviour.
There is also the issue of optimal sequencing in the introduc-
tion of the different components of the flexicurity policy mix.
Which policy should come first? Is there a way to make the
mix and the various phases credible to workers? In this regard,
the degree of trust between social partners - workforce, com-
panies and the State - is crucial. Countries with a high level of
trust between labour and companies have recorded a lower in-
crease in unemployment than others (Blanchard (2007)). Trust
should exist at different levels (Eurofond (2007)).
Finally, the Danish model is expensive: a protection system
based on unemployment benefits and active labour market poli-
cies implies high budgetary costs. Is it feasible for Italy to im-
plement the Danish model considering its high unemployment
and budgetary difficulties?
The demographic changes which reduce the number of working
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age people, thus lowering labour supply, challenge the ability
of financing a system marked by generous unemployment ben-
efits and a broad range of ALMPs, as well as the whole welfare
system in general. Secondly, as the Danish labour market sug-
gests - in periods of high pressure and technological progress - a
large part of population will be potentially at risk of exclusion
from the labour market. What will be the cost of its adoption
in Italy? Simple quantitative exercise illustrates the large fi-
nancial implications of adopting a generous system of labour
market policies. The implicit increase in ALMP that would
result from the adoption of the Danish spending intensity is to
high for the Italian budget.
Figure (4) and (5), respectively, show the average spending on
active and passive labour market policies in Italy and Denmark
per unemployed and as a percentage of GDP. From these figures
a huge gap in spending clearly emerges, both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of GDP.
But which are the scope for implementing such a policy in
Italy? As is well-known, the budgetary situation is not very
positive in Italy. Figure (6) reminds us of the main constraints
to policy changes in Italy. Both the overall debt and deficit
(as a percentage of GDP) imply that there is no possibility of
credibly funding higher spending in labour market policies by
means of debt emissions.
The other strategy could be by means of taxation. Denmark,
as well as Italy, has already one of the largest taw wedges on
labour income among European countries. What will be the
consequences of higher taxation? An exercise has been per-
formed by Zhou (2007). Taking into account the endogeneity
of the tax wedge to unemployment and that of unemployment
to the tax wedge, the author found that the results of adopting
flexicurity policies will crucially depend on the initial level and
budgetary situation of the country. The theoretical framework
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developed has been applied to the French economy to outline
the main results. In France, and in other countries facing high
unemployment and budgetary constraints, the implementation
of the flexicurity model could be too expensive and the re-
duction in unemployment might be limited over the first years.
Though offering important insights, the analysis completely ne-
glects the existence of a dual market and the model sensitivity
to parameter specification.
3.6.1 Flexicurity pathway for Italy
As the previous discussion suggests, there is limited scope for
Italy to increase spending in ALMP and PLMP. Moreover, as
the Danish experience suggests, these policies do not become
more effective simply by raising total spending. Their effec-
tiveness depends on their quality and their labour market rel-
evance. The Italian labour market is a dual labour market
where insecure temporary jobs coexist with highly protected
or not flexible regular jobs. The application of flexicurity and
equity principles calls for a fairer redistribution - across all
workers’ categories - of the cost of securing a flexible labour
market (Ichino (2008)). The most practicable solution for Italy
seems to be pathway no. 1. This pathway is particularly in-
teresting for countries where the key challenge is a segmented
labour market, with outsiders and insiders (European Com-
mission (2007)). The main aim of this pathway is distribute
flexibility and security more evenly over the workforce. So far
open-ended contracts (job protection) have been the way to
protect workers in Italy - and yet training opportunities and
social security mostly depend on having such contracts.
In particular, priority must be given to address segmentation
by means of contractual arrangements, which entail limited
costs compared to active labour market policies, and take less
time to deliver. This pathway will improve the position of
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workers with fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work con-
tracts, etc., by limiting the consecutive use of non-standard
contracts and promoting timely progress towards better con-
tracts. In addition, open-ended contracts must be redesigned
to include progressive build-up protection, starting from a ba-
sic level of job protection and guaranteeing automatic progress
into better contractual conditions until full protection is achieved.
In so doing, the risk of getting stuck in less protected con-
tracts will be reduced and protection will build up progressively
with job tenure and security (Pirrone (2008)). On the lifelong
learning side, public authorities and employers should improve
training facilities for temporary workers. Nowadays, these cat-
egories often do not receive training opportunities. Incentives
for workers and companies must be designed, at regional as
well as at branch level, to ensure that everybody can benefit
from training and to enhance participation.
Active labour market policies must become more effective. More-
over, public employment services must be able to deal not only
with long-term unemployment, but also with a greater num-
ber of people experiencing frequent periods of unemployment.
In particular, public employment services need to be strength-
ened in order to provide opportunities for people to shift from
short-term to long-term contracts. Finally, temporary workers
must be put in a position to accumulate rights by improving
portability of entitlements from job to job.
3.7 Experimental analysis
The aim of this section is to rely on experimental analysis to
test the European flexicurity pathway no. 1 in order to under-
stand how contractual arrangements progressing towards bet-
ter working conditions may improve workers’ and companies’
situations. The experiment lasts 12 periods and in each period
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there are two contractual phases in each of which a firm can
hire a worker. Workers can only trade with one firm in each
period. In total there are 7 firms and 10 workers on the mar-
ket - therefore the experiment implements an excess demand
for workers. During the contractual phase, firms make contract
offers [w, e˜] to workers, which specify a wage w and a desired
effort e˜. Firms can make private or public offers. In the case
of a private offer, the firm specifies the identification number
(ID) of the worker with whom it wants to trade, and only this
worker is informed about the offer. This feature of the mar-
ket allows the parties to build up long-term work relationship
Brown et al. (2004). In the case of a public offer, all workers
and all other firms are informed about the offer and firms are
allowed to exclude up to 4 workers from an offer.
There is no third-party enforcing contracts. Workers may choose
any feasible effort e, irrespective of the contractually proposed
level . Effort is also non-verifiable. In fact, there is a given
chance that the economy may experience a negative shock in
some periods, leading some firms to suffer a loss. As firms
cannot observe the level of effort supplied by the workers and
there is no third part enforcing contracts, they are not able to
infer whether low profits are due to shocks or to workers’ low
efforts.
I conducted my experiment for two labour market environ-
ments (treatment A and B). The experiment was run in the
laboratory of CENTER at Tilburg University, relying on z-tree
software (Fischbacher (2007))2. In treatment A, there were no
protections: firms were allowed to make offers without restric-
tions to any worker. This means that firms had no firing costs.
The second environment (treatment B) only differs from the
previous one in terms of contract types. Appendix B contains
a sample of the instructions of the treatment with protections.
2I wish to thank Caterina Giannetti and Maria Bigoni for their help in conducting
this experiment.
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In particular, firms in this treatment were obliged to submit
offer to workers in the event of their being entitled to get an
offer. The worker’s right to get an offer was equal to the num-
ber of working periods he worked for the same firm. The salary
the firm had to pay in these compulsory offers must be at least
as high as the salary paid in the last period. There was, how-
ever, a trial period, as the right to get an offer starts only after
two consecutive periods with the same firm. Hence, by hir-
ing a worker for only one period, firms were still able to freely
submit offer to other workers. Moreover, companies were also
able to fire workers. At the end of each period, firms were
asked whether and which workers they wanted to fire. For
fired workers protections would not add up anymore, but firms
were obliged to submit an offer to them as long as their right
to get an offer was positive.
The monetary payoff for firms and workers was as follows. An
employed worker received the wage w specified in his contract
and had to bear the cost of effort provided c(e). Effort costs
increased convexly in the level of effort actually made (see the
Effort table in Appendix B). A worker that remained unem-
ployed in a given period received a payoff of 0 points, and his
monetary payoff can be written as
pi(w, e) =
{
w − c(e) if a contract is concluded
0 if no contracts
A firm monetary payoff depended on the number of workers
employed and the effort exerted by the worker(s). The produc-
tion function was characterized by a decreasing return to scale
of labour that was the only production factor. In addition,
with a 10% probability firms could suffer a 15-point loss. A
firm’s profit function can be written as
pi(w, e) =
 10 · e1 − w1 − s if 1 employee8 · e1 + 8 · e2 +−w1 − w2 − s if 2 employees0 if no contracts
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where e1 and e2 are the actual levels of effort, w1 and w2 are the
wages, and s is a negative shock. In the following paragraph
behavioural predictions and results are explained in detail.
3.7.1 Theoritical predictions
There are previous experimental studies on the important topic
of dismissal barriers and their effects on contract enforcements
and labour market efficiency (Brown et al. (2008); Falk et al.
(2008)). However, few of them consider the possibility of an
endogenous level of unemployment. For example, the work of
Altmann et al. (2008) which find evidence supporting theories
of efficiency wages, as well as for models of unemployment as
a worker disciplining device. Similarly, this paper analyses the
emergence of unemployment in a market where the level of ef-
fort is observable only with uncertainty and there are different
levels of contractual protections. In each treatment, firms can
employ no worker, one or two workers, and unemployment is
not voluntary, since it is caused by the firms’ employment poli-
cies. These policies might succeed in eliciting higher efforts
from workers according to different degree of protections. In
particular, in this settings, predictions are the following:
• the probability to be employed should be higher in the
second treatment
• the (average) chosen effort should be higher in the second
treatment
For models based on risk-neutral labour market behaviour is
hard to explain why protections should have real effects in equi-
libria where wages are allowed to adjust. The standard eco-
nomic model of employment protections, exemplified by the
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1994 OECD Jobs Study (OECD (1994a,b)), simply assumes
that protections are merely an adjustment cost with no redeem-
ing feature (MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007)). However,
in the presence of market imperfections, contractual arrange-
ments that progress into better conditions, like other labour
market policies, can improve the welfare of at least a subset of
agents.
The simple model of this experiment characterizes situations
where gradual protections draws their effectiveness from the
imperfections that prevent enforcement of contracts, and im-
perfect information about effort and personal characteristics,
as well as on the state of the economy, might plague labour
market outcome. Moreover, even though the provision of pro-
tections cannot eradicate all “unfair” behaviour, it can provide
the right incentive to the workers to exert the required level of
effort. Specifically, in treatment B, if a worker has worked hard,
but the firm receiving a negative shock decided to fire him, the
worker can subsequently take actions to impose a cost upon
the firm reducing his effort in obliged offers. This cost corre-
sponds to the penalty that behavioural economists have shown
that individual are willing to impose upon others whom they
feel have treated them unfairly. In psychological terms this
cost may correspond to a loss of a worker morale and a lower
performance for a period of time. This possibility should make
workers more willing to invest in the relationship, leading to
higher average effort in market with employment security. On
the other side of the same coin, the possibility for firm to fire
workers give them flexibility and acts at the same time as a
disciplining device, leading to lower level of unemployment.
These intuitions are in line with the analysis of (MacLeod
(2005)) that illustrates that when contracts are incomplete,
either because firms use subjective measures of performance,
or because relationship investments are difficult to measure,
efficiency may be enhanced with a long term contract that in-
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creases the cost of terminating employment. Also in line with
this analysis, the contractual protections in treatment B allow
the worker to impose a cost upon the employer. Finally, the
possibility to get increasing protections as the working relation-
ship gets longer decrees the hold-up of the employees, making
workers more willing to invest into a long-term relationship.
Drawing upon the literature on incomplete contracts, a number
of studies relying on field data (i.e.,MacLeod and Nakavachara
(2007); Wasmer (2006)), have recently shown how employment
law may enhance the regulation of the employment relation-
ship, especially when relationship specific investments are likely
to be important, thus leading to better labour outcomes. Simi-
larly, as the results from this experiments suggest, some form of
employment security, when firms cannot evaluate performance
objectively, can enhance aspects of the employment relation-
ship by making employee dismissal expensive without loosing
flexibility.
3.7.2 Results
How do contractual arrangements reflect differences in market
efficiency? To answer this question this section concentrates
on two measures of market efficiency: workers’ performance as
measured by the effort level of employed workers and unem-
ployment level.
Figure (7) displays average effort levels in the two treatments.
As predicted, effort is higher in the environment with contracts
that progress towards better protections. This is especially true
at the beginning of the relationship, when workers and firms
build up their relationship, but also towards the end of the
game the exerted level is higher compared to the base treatment
A. The Mann-Whitney U-test confirms this finding at a 1%
level.
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However, this might be driven by individual characteristics.
Table (7) reports results for a truncated regression of the effort
variable on a dummy for treatment along with individual char-
acteristics that were collected through a questionnaire at the
end of each session3. This regression confirms that in treat-
ment B, the level of effort exerted by workers is significantly
higher than the base treatment.
The second measure of market efficiency concerns the unem-
ployment level in the two different market environments. Fig-
ure (8) shows the total unemployment level in the two treat-
ments. On the whole, the unemployment level differs dramat-
ically in the two environments, as the Mann-Whitney U-test
confirms at a 1% level. Figure (9) shows the level of ‘endoge-
nous unemployment’ and the evolution of unemployment over
time. Significantly, the unemployment rate shows a decreasing
- and virtually always lower - pattern in the treatment with
gradual contractual protections. Even though this pattern does
not clearly emerge in the first period and unemployment rate
do not differ significantly at the beginning, towards the end of
the game the unemployment rate falls under treatment B with
better protections. One possible explanation is related to the
effort exerted by workers at the beginning of the game. As this
level is generally higher than in the base treatment, both work-
ers and firms continue to invest in their relationship (Anderhub
et al. (2003)). On the one hand, workers - in order to gain a
contract renewal and an increased degree of protections - ex-
3In addition to questions concerning the individual characteristics, such as age, gen-
der, field of studies, country of origin, number of years at university, there were questions
on past trustworthy behaviour as in Glaeser et al. (2000). More precisely, players were
asked:
• How often do you lend money to your friends?
• How often do you lend your personal possession to your friends (e.g., CDs,
clothes..)?
• How often do you intentionally leave your rooming groups hallway door unlocked
(when nobody is home)?
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Table 3: Estimation results truncated regression
EFFORT
treatment_B 5.8781***
(2.039)
female 5.2236***
(1.220)
age -0.6392**
(0.190)
years_at_univ 3.0094
(2.198)
period -0.1383
(0.095)
really_distrust -0.2501
(2.391)
sigma 4.2832***
(0.806)
ll -371.1532
N 390
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variables definition: treatment_B is equal to 1 for observations in treatment B; female
is a dummy variable for women; age is the age of the player; years_at_uni is the
number of years the individual has been studying at the university; period is a trend
variable; really_distrust is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual answered
‘never/sometimes’ to the question ‘How often did you lend money to your friend’ and
‘never/sometimes’ to the question ‘How often did you lend things to your friend?’.
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ert a high level of effort whereas, on the other hand, firms are
willing to invest in their relationship because, in case of a low
level of effort, they have the option to break this relationship.
In other words, firing acts as a disciplining device (flexibility),
while contractual protections act as an incentive to invest in
this relationship (security).
Table 4: Estimation results
PROBIT UNEMPLOYED
treatment_B -0.1749***
(0.030)
female -0.4921***
(0.061)
years_at_univ -0.1688**
(0.072)
age 0.0123***
(0.003)
period -0.0066*
(0.004)
really_distrust 0.3610**
(0.155)
ll -192.3273
N 312
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
See previous table for variable definitions.
This result is confirmed by a probit analysis, reported in table
(4), where the dummy for treatment B negatively and signif-
icantly affects the probability of being unemployed also when
controlling individual characteristics.
3.8 Conclusions
The aim of this work was investigate different paths of flexicu-
rity in Europe. The experience of various European countries
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has shown that flexibility and security are not necessarily di-
verging. However, although common principles might drive
reforms, flexicurity should take up different forms from coun-
try to country. Therefore, the main objective of this paper
was focus on Italy to analyse which of the pathways towards
flexicurity identified by the European Commission is the best
suited to this country. To gain insights on the advantages and
disadvantages inherent in adopting such policies, the first part
of the analysis looked at flexicurity in Denmark, one of the
leading country in this field. Even though it is not possible to
directly transpose policies from Denmark to Italy, important
results were recorded. It emerged that in Italy - mainly due
to budgetary constraints - a shift from employment protection
system to an unemployment insurance system as in Denmark
is not feasible. In addition, the application of flexicurity and
equity principles to the dual structure of the Italian labour
market calls for a fairer redistribution - across all workers’ cat-
egories - of the cost of securing a flexible labour market. On
the whole, this analysis suggested the first European pathway
as the most practicable solution for Italy. According to this
pathway, priority must be given to address segmentation by
means of contractual arrangements, designing contracts which
- starting from a basic level - include progressive protections.
Based on experimental analysis, the second part of this work
investigated how contractual arrangements turn into market
efficiency. The two experimental treatments performed only
differed in the level of contractual protections. In the base
treatment, there were no protections and firms were allowed
to make offer without restrictions to any worker. In the main
treatment workers were able to gain a right to receive an of-
fer as the length of the working relationship increased. How-
ever, firms were also allowed to fire workers. Significantly, in
this experiment the level of unemployment was determined en-
dogenously and the level of effort was observable with a certain
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degree of uncertainty. Results suggest that - especially in coun-
tries such as Italy, where there is limited scope for increasing
spending - these contractual arrangements can improve both
workers’ and firms’ situations. As expected, the effort was
higher and the level of unemployment significantly decreased
in the environment with contracts which progress towards bet-
ter protections. One possible explanation for this result is the
right balance between flexibility and security: firing acts as
a disciplining device (flexibility), thus making workers exert
higher levels of effort, while the contractual protections act as
an incentive to invest in the relationship (security), thus mak-
ing worker more willing to invest in longer relationship and also
firms more willing to hire more workers.
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Figure 4: ALMP and PLMP in Italy and Denmark
Source: EUROSTAT
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Figure 5: ALMP as % of GDP
Source: EUROSTAT
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Figure 6: Budgetary situation in Italy and Denmark
Source: EUROSTAT
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Figure 7: Effort across treatment
Figure 8: Total unemployment across treatment
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Figure 9: Unemployment across period and treatment
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.1 Appendix
Council of the European Union
The Common principle of flexicurity
• Flexicurity is a means to strengthen the implementation
of the Lisbon Strategy, create more and better jobs, mod-
ernise labour markets, and promote good work through
new forms of flexibility and security to increase adapt-
ability, employment and social cohesion.
• Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexi-
ble and reliable contractual arrangements, comprehensive
lifelong learning strategies, effective active labour mar-
ket policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social
protection systems.
• The flexicurity approaches are not about one single labour
market or working life model, nor about a single policy
strategy: they should be tailored to the specific situa-
tions of each Member State. Flexicurity implies a balance
between rights and responsibilities of all the people con-
cerned. On the basis of common principles, each Mem-
ber State should develop its own flexicurity arrangements.
Progress should be effectively monitored.
• Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and in-
clusive labour markets by overcoming segmentation. It
concerns both those in work and those out of work. The
inactive, the unemployed, those who have an undeclared
work, an unstable employment, or are at the margins of
the labour market need to be granted better opportu-
nities, economic incentives and supportive measures for
easier access to work or stepping-stones to assist their
progress towards stable and legally secure employment.
Support should be available to all those in employment to
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remain employable, to progress and manage transitions
both in work and between jobs.
• Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicu-
rity are equally important and should be promoted. Suf-
ficient contractual flexibility must be matched by secure
transitions from job to job. Upward mobility needs to be
facilitated, as well as between unemployment or inactivity
and work. High-quality and productive workplaces, good
organisation of work, and continuous upgrading of skills
are also essential. Social protection should provide incen-
tives and support for job transitions and for access to new
employment.
• Flexicurity should support gender equality, by promoting
equal access to quality employment for women and men
and offering measures to reconcile work, family and pri-
vate life.
• Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based
dialogue among all stakeholders, where everybody is ready
to shoulder responsibility for change with a view to im-
plementing socially balanced policies. While public au-
thorities retain overall responsibility, the involvement of
social partners in designing and implementing flexicurity
policies through social dialogue and collective bargaining
is of crucial importance.
• Flexicurity requires a cost-effective allocation of resources
and should remain fully compatible with sound and fi-
nancially sustainable public budgets. It should also aim
at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially be-
tween businesses, public authorities and individuals, with
particular attention to the SMEs’ specific situation.
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.2 Appendix
Instructions. Treatment B
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please
read the following instructions carefully. Everything that you
need to know to participate in this experiment is explained
below. Should you have any difficulties in understanding these
instructions please notify us by raising your hand. We will
answer your questions at your place.
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial
sum of 6 euros corresponding to 200 points. During the course
of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by
gaining other points. The amount of points that you can gain
during the experiment depends on your decisions and other
participants’ decisions. All the points that you gain during
the experiment will be exchanged into euros at the end of the
experiment. The exchange rate will be:
1 point = 3 cents
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money
that you earned during the experiment in addition to your 6
euros initial sum.
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you
have to make decisions in different stages. Your decision will
be entered into a computer. There are 12 periods in total.
Please note that communication between participants is strictly
prohibited during the experiment. In addition we would like to
point out that you may only use the computer functions which
are required for the experiment. Communication between par-
ticipants and unnecessary interference with computers will lead
to exclusion from the experiment. Should you have any ques-
tions we shall be glad to assist you.
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At the beginning of the experiment you will be divided into
2 groups: firms and workers. In this experiment there are
workers and firms. You shall be a worker or a firm for the entire
course of the experiment. As all the other participants, you will
have an identification number (ID), randomly assigned by the
computer, which you will keep for the entire experiment, except
in the trial period. During the trial period, all participants will
receive a provisional ID which will be changed as soon as the
true game starts. Your ID will be displayed on top of the
screen.
An overview of the experiment procedures
In each period of the experiment every worker can deal with
one firm. The firm earns a profit if the effort exercised by the
worker exceeds the wage and no adverse shock occurs. The
worker earns a profit as long as he/she receives and accepts
an offer, and the salary he/she gains covers the cost of the
delivered effort.
The experiment lasts 12 periods. Every period is made up
of 7 stages which include two contractual phases (in stage 1
and stage 3). Each worker and each firm can only enter one
agreement in each contractual phase. Each firm can hire a
maximum of 2 workers per period, whereas a worker can enter
only into one contract per period. At least 3 workers will not
reach any contracts in each period.
In every period, the procedures are as follows:
STAGE 1. The first contractual phase. Each period starts
with a contractual phase, which lasts 150 seconds. During
this phase firms can submit offers, which can be accepted by
workers.
When submitting an offer a firm has to specify three things: -
the salary offered; - which level of effort it requires from the
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worker; - and finally, to which worker it wants to submit its
the offer.
Hereby, firms can submit two types of offers; private offers and
public offers. Private offers are submitted to one worker only
and can only be accepted (and seen) by that worker. Public
offers are submitted to all workers and can be accepted by
any worker. Firms can submit as many offers as they like in
each period, and are allowed to exclude up to 4 workers from a
public offer. The offers submitted can be accepted constantly.
In some cases, as explained further below, the worker has the
right to receive a compulsory offer from a firm. In that case,
the firm is obliged to make an offer that can be seen only by
the worker to whom this offer must be addressed.
STAGE 2. Decision to hire a second worker. Following this
first contractual phase, firms are asked whether they want to
hire a second worker. Should they wish to hire a second worker
(or a worker if they concluded no contract in the previous
stage), they will enter a second contractual phase in STAGE
3, which is the same as the contractual phase in STAGE 1. In
this stage, firms are also notified whether they should submit
a compulsory offer. This phase lasts 15 seconds.
STAGE 3. The second contractual phase. Only firms that
want to hire a second worker namely that answered yes in
STAGE 2 - or have to submit a compulsory offer, and work-
ers which did not conclude any contract in the first contrac-
tual phase will enter this second contractual phase. This stage
is the same as STAGE 1 and lasts 150 seconds. During this
phase firms can submit offers, which can be accepted by work-
ers. Each offer has to specify the salary offered, the level of
effort required, as well as the worker to which the offer is tar-
geted. Once again, firms can submit private and public offers,
and may be obliged to submit an offer.
***Please note***: If the same firm has hired the same worker
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in two or more consecutive periods, the worker enjoys the "right
to get an offer" according to the number of periods he/she
worked for this firm. The right to get an offer is the number
of periods the worker must receive an offer from the same firm
with a salary at least as high as the one in the last period and
is equal to
Right to get an offer= number of working periods
with the same firm
When the right to get an offer is equal or greater than one, the
firm has to make an offer in the following period(s). Depending
on the latest contractual phase, the right to get an offer could
be either in the next contractual phase 1 or 2. If the worker
accepts the compulsory offer (or another offer from the same
firm in the same period), the "right to get an offer" continues
to exist. If he/she rejects and/or accepts another offer from
a different firm, the firm is free to make an offer to any other
worker. Once the firm has submitted the compulsory offer,
the worker has 15 seconds to accept/reject the offer from the
firm. Once this time has elapsed, the firm is also free to make
offers to other workers. Be careful! If the firm does not submit
the compulsory offer the computer will automatically after 50
seconds send the offer to the worker with the level of wage
equal to the last wage and a level of desired effort equal to
zero. Once again the worker again may either accept or reject
but without any time limit.
STAGE 4. Choosing the level of effort. Following the con-
tractual phases, each worker who has entered an agreement
determines which level of effort he/she will supply to his/her
firm. Therefore the worker is not obliged to supply the desired
level of effort demanded by the firm.
STAGE 5. Your Income. Once every worker has chosen which
level of effort to supply, incomes gained by each participant in
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that period are calculated and shown on the screen. This stage
lasts 10 seconds. The income of the firm depends on the level
of effort supplied by the worker(s), but also on the state of the
economy. There is a 10% given chance that a negative shock
will hit the economy, thus leading some firms to suffer from
a 15 points loss. The worker’s income depends on the effort
he/she chose and the wage received.
STAGE 6. A worker may be fired. Each worker, after two
consecutive periods with the same firm, is entitled to receive an
offer from that firm in the following period. At the end of each
period, however, the firm that has hired some workers for two
or more consecutive periods is asked whether and which worker
it wants to fire. For workers who have not been fired, the right
to get an offer will increase by 1 in each period with the same
firm obliged to submit the offer. For fired worker(s) protections
will not add up anymore. Firms, however, are obliged to make
an offer for a number of periods equal to the worker’s right
to get an offer. Therefore, even if in the following periods the
worker accepts an offer from that firm, these periods will not
contribute anymore to the computation of the right to get an
offer. The right to get an offer is kept (and can be exercised)
as long as the worker accepts an offer from that firm. For each
period the fired worker receives a compulsory offer, the right
to get an offer decrease by 1.
Be careful! If in the last period the worker was hired in contrac-
tual phase 1, he has the right to receive an offer in contractual
phase 1. If the worker was hired in the last period in contrac-
tual phase 2, he has the right to receive an offer in contractual
phase 2. However, he/she will not lose his/her right by accept-
ing an offer from the same firms in a different phase.
STAGE 7. Notification stage. Notification is provided to fired
workers. In this stage, workers are notified of their having being
fired and of their right to receive an offer.
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On your screen a message will appear informing you whether
you are a firm or a worker, so that you can carefully read the
detailed instructions either for workers or firms.
The experiment will not commence until all participants are
completely familiar with all the procedures. In order to secure
that this is the case, we kindly ask you to make the exercises
which will appear on your computer screen.
In addition we will conduct a training trial of the trading phase,
so that you can get accustomed to the computer. This trial
phase will not be added to the result of the experiment and
therefore not remunerated. Following the trial phase we will
begin the experiment, which will last 12 periods.
Procedures in detail: instructions for workers
Please read the following instructions carefully if you are a
worker.
You are a worker for the entire experiment. The experiment
lasts 12 periods. Each period is made up of 7 stages. In each
period you can conclude only one contract. During the ex-
periment you will enter your decisions into the computer. We
describe after in detail how you can make your decisions in
each stage of the game.
STAGE 1. The first contractual phase. Each period starts
with a contractual phase. During the contractual phase each
worker can enter into an agreement with one firm. In order to
do so, firms can submit offers to the workers. As a worker you
can accept one of the offers submitted to you in each period.
During the contractual phase, on the top left corner of your
screen you will see the current period of the experiment. In the
top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in
this contractual phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase
in each period lasts 150 seconds. In the top at the centre of
the screen you will see your ID. When this time is over, the
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contractual phase is over. Therefore no further offers can be
submitted or accepted for this period.
As a worker you can accept the offers that firms have submitted
to you. There are two types of offers which you can accept:
- Private offers to you: each firm has the opportunity to
submit private offers to you. You alone will be informed of
these offers and you alone can accept them. No other worker
or firm is informed of these offers. If you receive private offers,
they will appear on your screen, and in the column below the
title "offer" you will see "private".
-Public offers: each firm has also the possibility of submitting
public offers. All workers are informed of these offers and any
worker can accept them. If a firm submits a public offer it
will appear on your screen, and below the column below the
title "offer" you will read "public ". However, a firm is able to
exclude up to 4 workers from a public offer. As a worker, you
will not see the public offer from which you have been excluded.
The offer of a firm - either public or private - must specify the
salary offered and the level of effort required.
To accept an offer you have to select it and press the button
"confirm". As soon as you have pressed the "confirm" button
you will see a screen reporting the details of the offer you have
selected: the salary you will be paid and the ID of your op-
ponent firm. At the same time, the firm will be notified that
you have accepted the offer and will not be able to submit any
further offers
In some circumstances, you have the right to get an offer from
a firm.
- Compulsory offers to you: if you have worked with the
same firm for two or more consecutive periods, and as long
as you have a positive right to get an offer, on the bottom
of your screen a new box will appear where you will receive a
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"compulsory offer" from that firm. In this case the wage offered
by the firm must be at least as high as in your last period.
Under this box, you can also see the level of your right to get
an offer and whether the firm has fired you or not. You may
either "accept" or "reject" that offer, by pressing the relative
button. Once the firm has submitted to you a compulsory
offer, you have to reach a decision in 15 seconds, otherwise the
offer will disappear. As long as you have not decided yet, and
the 15 seconds have not elapsed yet, "your" firm cannot make
another offer to you or to another worker. However, you can
still receive other offers from different firms. This means that
you can accept the offer of "your" firm as long as you have
not declined it (and time has not elapsed yet ) or accept other
offers. Your firm will be informed about your decision. If you
reject the offer or if you accept another firm’s offer, "your" firm
is free to make offers to other workers and your right to get an
offer from that firm will be set to zero. However, if in the same
stage you rejected the compulsory offer, you accepted another
offer from the same firm, your right to get an offer will be
kept. The same will happen if you accept the compulsory offer
of "your" firm. In both cases, if you have been fired your right
to get an offer will decrease by 1. Otherwise, if you have not
been fired, also this period will add up to your right to get an
offer. Only if you reject the compulsory offer or if you accept
the offer of another firm, your right to get an offer expires. This
means that the right to get an offer can only be relinquished
by you, because you reject the compulsory offer by pressing
the "reject" button, you do not accept it in 15 seconds or you
accept another offer from a different firm.
Each worker can conclude only one contract in each period.
Once you have accepted one offer you cannot accept any further
offer.
All firms have to comply with the following rules when submit-
ting trade offers:
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The wage offered by the firm may not be lower than 0 or higher
than 100:
0 ≤ offered wage ≤ 100
Moreover, in compulsory offers, the wage offered may not be
lower than the wage offered in the previous period:
previous wage ≤ offered wage ≤ 100
The effort required by the firm may not be lower than 1 or
higher than 10:
1 ≤ desired effort ≤ 10
You have not to worry about these constraints since the com-
puter will check entries from every participant.
As long as no offer has been accepted by a worker, the firm
can make as many public and private offers as it wishes. Each
offer submitted by a firm can be accepted at any time during
the trading phase. Once all firms have concluded a contract or
150 seconds have elapsed, the contractual phase is over.
STAGE 2. Decision to hire a second worker. In this stage
firms are asked if they want to hire another worker. As a
worker you will not enter this stage.
STAGE 3. The second contractual phase. This stage is the
same as STAGE 1. During this phase workers who have not
concluded any contract in the first contractual phase can enter
into an agreement with one firm. You will enter this stage
only if you did not reach any contract in STAGE 1, and there
is a firm willing to hire a second worker or has to submit a
compulsory offer to you.
STAGE 4. Choosing the level of effort. Following the contrac-
tual phases, you will enter this stage only if you are a worker
who has concluded a contract in the first or second contractual
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phase. On the screen, you will see the ID of your opponent
firm, the wage you will receive from that firm, as well as the
level of effort you are required to supply. However, you are
not obliged to supply the desired level of effort required by the
firm. You can provide any level of effort ranging from 1 to 10.
1 ≤ actual level of effort ≤ 10 (1)
To confirm your choice press the "ok" button. As long as you
have not pressed "ok" you can change your choice. Once you
have pressed the "ok" button, your level of effort is determined
and you will leave this stage.
STAGE 5. Your income. If you have not concluded any
contract during a trading phase, you will not gain an income
for this period. Your profit will be zero.
If you reached a contract, either in the first or the second con-
tractual phase, your income depends on the wage you accepted
and the level of effort you decided to deliver. Your income will
be calculated as follows:
your income = wage - cost of effort
The higher the level of the effort chosen, the higher the cost of
your effort. The costs for each level of effort are displayed in
the subsequent table:
EFFORT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COST OF EFFORT 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Therefore the higher your income, the lower your level of effort.
Furthermore, the higher your income, the higher is the wage
offered by the firm.
No firm will know the workers’ real income and effort with
certainty. The firms know how much cost is needed for a worker
to deliver a precise level of effort. This means that the firms
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know the "effort table". However, your income and effort will
not be displayed to the firms. Moreover, firms cannot infer
from their income the level of effort you have chosen - with
certainty - as there is a 10% given chance that firms will be hit
by a negative shock. If in a certain a firm records lower profits,
it may be either due to a negative shock or to a low level of
effort made by its workers.
The income of your firm: on the contrary, workers can observe
the level of firm profits. In particular, as a worker, in each
period you will see the profit earned by your opponent firm.
If a firm does not hire any worker it will get 0 points for that
period.
If a firm hire a worker, its income depends on the wage of-
fered and the level of effort made supplied by this worker. The
income of your firm will be calculated as follows:
- if it has hired only one worker:
Firm income = 10* your level of effort - your wage - shock
- if it has hired two workers:
Firm income = 8* your level of effort + 8*effort 2nd worker -
your wage - 2nd wage - shock
where by shock we mean the negative shock, equal to 15 points,
and the probability of an adverse shock is equal to 10
As you can see from the above mentioned formula the higher
the income of your firm, the higher the level of effort actually
supplied by you and the other worker and the lower the wages.
Please note that workers and firms can suffer losses in each
period. These losses have to be paid from your initial sum of
money or from earnings in other periods.
You will be informed of your income on an "income screen".
On this screen the following will be displayed: - the firm with
which you traded; - your wage; - the level of effort required by
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your firm; - the level of effort supplied by you; - the income of
your buyer in this period; - your income in this period.
STAGE 6. Firing stage. As a worker you will not enter this
stage. At the end of each period, if a firm has hired some
workers for two or more consecutive periods - hence the worker
has the right to get an offer - it is asked whether and which
workers it wants to fire. This period lasts 20 seconds.
STAGE 7. Firing notification. Notification will be provided
to fired workers are notified. In this stage, workers are told
whether they have been fired in this period or in the previous
ones, as long as their right to receive an offer is greater or equal
to zero. This period lasts 10 seconds.
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EXERCISES
Please solve the following problems. Should you have any ques-
tions, please ask the researcher in charge of the experiment.
Wrong answers have no consequences whatsoever.
Problem 1: A contract envisages a wage equal to 60 and a
desired level of effort equal to 9. The worker chose a real effort
equal to 9. Which is the income of the worker? - 45
- 50
- 45 with no shock, and 30 if a shock occurs
Which is the income of the firm with only one worker?
- 30
- 45
- 30 with no shock, and 15 if a shock occurs
Problem 2:
A contract envisages a wage equal to 50 and a desired level of
effort equal to 8. The worker chose a real effort equal to 7.
Which is the worker’s income?
- 38
- 40
- 38 with no shock, and 23 if a shock occurs
Which is the income of the firm with only one worker?
- 20
- 30
- 20 with no shock, and 5 if a shock occurs
- with no shock, and 15 if a shock occurs
Problem 3: Let us assume that the worker accepted a private
offer from a particular firm in period 5. In period 6 the worker
accepted a public offer coming from the same firm. Do the
worker enjoy the right to get an offer starting from period 7?
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- Yes
- No
If so, it is equal to
- 0
- 1
- 2
Problem 4: Let us assume there is a worker with a current
right to get an offer equal to 3 who accepted a compulsory offer
from the firm during the same period.
In that case, what happens to the right to get an offer if the
worker were fired by this firm? - Decrease by 1
- Increase by 1
What happens if the worker were not fired? - Decrease by 1
- Increase by 1
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